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Clearing the Country: A History of the Hudson's Bay Company's Fur Desert Policy (127 
pp.) 
In the 1820s and 1830s, the Hudson's Bay Company worked to maintain its holdings 
north of the Columbia River in Oregon Territory without violating the joint occupation 
agreement Britain had signed with the United States. One Company response to the 
Americans' impending encroachment into the territory, the fur desert policy, directed its 
employees to trap out the furbearing animals, principally beaver, from the Snake River 
region, making it economically unattractive to the Americans. The Company wanted to 
create a buffer zone between American territory and the beaver preserves in New 
Caledonia (now British Columbia). 
Nine Snake Country Expeditions, between 1824 and 1831, form the core of the fur 
desert policy. The Expeditions covered the area that now encompasses parts of Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, Utah, Nevada, and California. Prior trapping expeditions by the North 
West Company, native people's trapping activities, and, possibly, environmental 
conditions aided in the policy's success. Beaver reproductive biology further abetted the 
policy's goals. 
The consequences of the fur desert policy have not been discussed or analyzed in fur 
trade or Company histories. Using studies of the beaver's role in ecosystems, traders' and 
explorers' journals, and the historical record of native communities' activities in the 
decades surrounding the policy, a picture of the environmental and cultural consequences 
can be sketched. 
While beaver removal did not destroy either the environment or the cultures of Snake 
Country, it contributed to the environmental degradation of the region seen today, and 
may have provided one of the catalysts for cultural change on the Columbia Plateau. As a 
result of the reduced amount of beaver activity in the region, species abundance and 
diversity most likely declined. Over time, continued trapping pressure and habitat 
reduction caused by agriculture and ranching exacerbated the consequences of beaver 
removal. Concurrently, Northern Shoshone, Northern Bannock, Cayuse, and Nez Perce 
shifted their subsistence activities. Further study is needed to determine the exact 
connection between the fur desert policy and cultural change, but it most certainly played 
a role. 
Advisor; Dan Flores 
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Introduction 
Sitting in the middle of a ponderosa pine forest, at the edge of the Columbia 
Gorge (out of sight of any of the dams), or down in the midst of a sagebrush prairie on the 
Snake River Plains, it is easy to forget the fundamental environmental changes that have 
occurred in the Northwest in the last 200 years. Human influence on the land here long 
precedes the nineteenth century, of course, but the scale and consequences of human 
action in the Northwest, as elsewhere, increased dramatically with the Europeans' entry 
into the region in the early nineteenth century. The first relatively long-term Euro-
American residents in the region, the North West Company and the Hudson's Bay 
Company employees, came here for the beaver. They were not interested in the land itself 
and they did not concern themselves with the local communities other than as sources of 
pelts, horses, or sustenance in times of need. The trappers embodied the capitalist ethos in 
their focus on only doing and learning that which would help them gain more pelts. They 
were the start of a long line of people, products of the societies from which they came, 
who saw the natural resources as commodities to be extracted for outside consumption 
and gain. 
The lumber from these ponderosa and other forests brought people and capital to 
the Northwest. They are, along with almost any other forest around here, different today 
in the average age of the trees, the diversity of plant and animal species, and the 
population size of any animals living among them. Logging practices have altered the 
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habitat so as to favor different species. Hunting pressure increased exponentially as more 
and more Euro-Americans settled the area in the late 1800s.' 
The Columbia River's ability to transport goods brought attention to it 
first as a possible outlet of the ever-elusive Northwest Passage and later for its ability to 
generate power. Existing on a whole different scale of size and time, the river does not 
seem to be obliged to bend to peoples' desires. But it has been turned into one reservoir 
after another. The recent decline in salmon is truly alarming and what the river was 
before it became a "thing" to be put to work for people has been lost. If the human impact 
on this river continues as it has in the past, it will soon be nothing more than a canal 
surrounded by beautiful scenery. 
Prior to the lumbering years and the multitude of dams on the Columbia, the 
Snake River provided a route to another commodity: beaver pelts. Snake Country, the 
area surrounding the Snake, Columbia, and several other drainage systems, bore the brunt 
of the first blow dealt by the market economy in the Northwest - the fur trade. As a 
consequence, the ecosystem here lost biodiversity, water quality, erosion control, and 
wildlife habitat. The fur trade's history in the Snake Country is particularly interesting 
because it represents a long era of Euro-American attitudes toward the western United 
States in microcosm and in the extreme. 
In 1824, George Simpson, field governor for the Hudson's Bay Company 
(hereafter HBC), began to develop the Columbia District (what is now Washington, 
Oregon, and parts of Idaho and Montana) into a profitable and well-established outpost 
for the Company. Economic benefit for the Company provided a catalyst to this initiative. 
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Political necessity for the British government in their dispute over the "Oregon Question" 
with the Americans may have also played a part. By 1824, despite a joint occupation 
convention signed in 1818, both Britain and the United States were anxious for a more 
certain establishment of their own claims to the region. The British wanted to clarify their 
claim south at least to the Columbia River and the Americans wanted to push the British 
back to the 49th parallel. One Company response to this question of claims, what has 
been since named the fur desert policy, emanated from George Simpson and directed 
HBC trapping parties to clear furbearing animals firom the Snake River region. The policy 
is an example of a level of international relations, which, while attempting to repel 
Americans, directly affected the environment and the local inhabitants — native, British, 
and American. 
Wanting to retain their monopoly and to continue to have access to the Columbia 
River for transporting goods, the Hudson's Bay Company resisted American occupation 
and claim to the Oregon Country. The Company repelled American trappers' entry into 
the fur trade in the Oregon Country through a variety of strategies. These ranged from 
general intimidation and alliances with Indian bands to undermining fur prices by 
accepting fewer pelts than the Americans for trade goods. In addition to these standard fur 
trade practices, the Hudson's Bay Company also attempted to create a "fur desert" in 
Snake Country, the region extending south and southeast of the Columbia District into 
what is now parts of Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and Northern California. 
Six Snake Country Expeditions were organized between 1824 and 1830 to carry 
out the fur desert policy. Additional expeditions went out in the 1830's, but they had less 
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impact on the region, largely because those in the 1820's had succeeded in trapping out 
the beaver. Peter Skene Ogden led each of these trapping expeditions in the 1820's, save 
for Alexander Ross' 1823-1824 trip, which had both economic and political purposes. 
Because Hudson's Bay Company's officials had resigned themselves to losing the 
territory south of the Columbia River eventually, they resolved to obtain the maximum 
number of pelts from the region before the American trappers and settlers overran it. This 
extensive trapping would create the fur desert in which there were no fur-bearing animals 
in the area between the American claim on the east side of the Rockies and the Hudson's 
Bay Company lands on the western side, thereby establishing a buffer zone between the 
competition (Americans) and themselves. This hopefully would discourage American 
trappers from entering the Northern Rockies and the Columbia District. As long as the 
HBC continued trapping in the Columbia District, they wanted to eliminate competition, 
even if they could not prevent American settlement. Two centuries of competition with 
French fur traders and then the North West Company across the continent had created this 
attitude towards other interested parties. 
Interestingly, the consequences of this fur desert policy are not discussed or 
analyzed in fur trade or Hudson's Bay Company histories, probably due to the shift in 
attention to American settlement in the territorial dispute. The Snake Country 
Expeditions effectively ended in 1832 when the beaver populations failed in Snake 
Country and the British government focused on a higher level of international relations. 
However, environmental and social historians have yet to examine this rather infamous 
event in early Western history. An analysis of the policy reveals insights into human 
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interaction between cultural groups and social classes in the Hudson's Bay Company. 
Moreover, such an examination shows how international politics and the introduction of 
the market economy into the Pacific Northwest severely disrupted the Snake River 
Country's ecology and the subsistence systems of those living upon it. 
The fur desert policy demonstrates how far fur-trapping companies were willing 
to go in their exploitation of nature and it provides a window into other aspects of the fur 
trade. Because of the diplomatic nature of the dispute, the policy reveals something of the 
nature of the Company's relationsliip with the British government. The HBC held a 
monopoly charter granted by the Crown in 1670. Through the charter, the Company 
operated as a monopoly in the Columbia District. Company officials were government 
officials in that they maintained the judicial system in the region £ind they regulated 
activities, such as trade and settlement. In short, they provided all the functions of a 
colonial or territorial government. The government in Britain remained aloof from but 
aware of the HBC s policies in the Northwest because of domestic and international 
issues. That the Crown did not stop the fur desert policy indicates implicit approval of the 
tactic.^ 
Examining the fur desert policy also provides an opportunity to pose questions 
regarding gender and race relations in the fur trade. These include not only which jobs or 
tasks each group performed, but also how gender and race influenced the level of success 
of the trade. What has long been considered largely in terms of British men conquering 
the wilderness needs to be reviewed in light of the incredible diversity of people working 
in the region. To view the HBC and their activities in the Oregon Country only from the 
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officers' perspective limits our knowledge. The Expeditions included men and women 
who were from the British, American, Iroquois, Flathead, Hawaiian, Orkneymen, Métis 
and probably other ethnic groups. Additionally, local people actively or indirectly 
participated in or resisted the fur trade. All of these people worked and lived in Oregon 
Country and they changed culturally and economically in response to their work. 
The environment is included in my thesis because the fur desert policy rested on a 
particular environment's desirable resources. The policy also fundamentally altered that 
environment. Beaver ecology partially determined the success of the fur desert policy. As 
a consequence of the policy, beaver numbers declined to near extirpation, which had 
numerous effects on the physical nature of the environment. The fur desert's 
consequences continue to today. Beaver populations in the states that encompass Snake 
Country today have never fully rebounded from the fur trade generally and particularly 
from the fur desert. This has affected streamflow and hydrological systems, as well as the 
lifeways of native populations and more recent Euro-American arrivals. 
Finally, what does this policy say about British relations with the land, in contrast 
to both native and American views of the place? What led them to such a radical policy ? 
What connection does it have with earlier and later Euro-American activities in the 
region? Each of these questions needs to be considered from the perspective that Oregon 
Country was not home and held no attachment for the British and that made it possible 
for them to exploit the region for as much resource wealth as possible. It is the difference 
between a region's being simply space and one's being a place to the people living and 
working there. 
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Histories of the Hudson's Bay Company during the 1820's abound. The 
company's history holds significance for Americans because this era produced the debate 
over the "Oregon Question." The British and Canadians identify with that significance 
and add their interest in the Hudson's Bay Company's fate in the region and in the 
distinctive, and sometimes distinguished, people who participated in the Snake Country 
Expeditions. None of the studies focuses on the fur desert policy itself 
One of the most important sources for the study of the Columbia District during 
Simpson's tenure is Fur Trade and Empire: George Simpson's Journal, edited by 
Frederick Merk. Merk focuses on the 1824-1825 journals and his introduction provides 
some cursory background for these years. He makes reference to part of the Snake 
Country Expeditions' purpose but he does not focus on the fur desert policy. ^ 
Other works on the Hudson's Bay Company and the fiir trade also mention but do 
not dwell on the policy. Richard Ruggles' A Country So Interesting: The Hudson's Bay 
Company and Two Centuries of Mapping, 1670-1870 (1991), Ray Allen Billington's 
Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier (1949), Hiram Chittenden's 
The American Fur Trade of the Far West (1935), and Daniel Francis' The Battle for the 
West: Fur Traders and the Birth of Western Canada (1982), all describe the policy and 
its intents. It is difficult to determine if these historians dismiss the fur desert policy 
because they lacked an interest in ecological manipulations or because American 
settlement made the policy a moot point by the 1830's and 1840's. David J. Wishart's 
The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A Geographical Synthesis, describes 
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the fur desert policy in more detail than other historians and discusses possible ecological 
factors and implications/ 
From the American diplomatic perspective on the "Oregon Question," the 
discussion is not significantly more complete. Frederick Merle's Manifest Destiny and 
Mission in America History: A Reinterpretation (1963) mentions a depletion of furs and 
competition with the British, causing the decline of the American fur trade in Oregon in 
the 1820's and 1830's. His other book on the subject, Albert Gallatin and the Oregon 
Problem: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy (1950) explains the fur desert policy as 
part of British actions in the Oregon Territory during negotiations to renew the joint 
occupation convention/ 
Although I have found no works on the fur desert policy itself, there are several 
by and about the Hudson's Bay Company employees and the Indian trappers who 
participated in the expeditions. Among these are Gloria Griffin Cline's Peter Skene 
Ogden and the Hudson's Bay Company (1974), Peter Skene Ogden: Fur Trader (1967) 
by Archie Binns, Alexander Ross' The Fur Hunters of the Far West (1956), and Lewis O. 
Saum's The Fur Trader and the Indian (1965). Focusing on women's roles in the fur 
trade, Sylvia Van Kirk's "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870 
(1980) and Jennifer S. H. Brown's Strangers in Blood speak generally to this topic. The 
Métis culture that developed in the Pacific Northwest is the topic of John C. Jackson's 
Children of the Fur Trade (1996). None of these explains the course or consequences of 
the policy, but they do provide helpful and useful insight into the structure, development, 
and activities of the Expeditions.^ 
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The focus thus far in works regarding the Columbia District fur trade and the 
Hudson's Bay Company has been on the expedition leaders and the higher level 
diplomatic relations between England and the United States. These texts pay very little 
attention to any ecological impact caused by the fur desert policy, or to the prevailing 
attitudes towEirds nature that enabled such a policy to be formed. Furthermore, they 
neglect gender and class issues to a large extent. It appears, in short, that historians note 
the existence of the policy but have not examined it in detail. 
The organizing scheme I will use to explain and show the implications of the fur 
desert policy relates to the purpose for this project. The Snake Country Expeditions 
reflect the nature of the North American fur trade and of international economic, political, 
and diplomatic relations. Through my thesis I will use the connection between the events, 
institutions, and ideas developed outside Oregon Territory and the fur desert policy to 
demonstrate how the policy was a product of the larger context. For example, the 
boundary dispute between Great Britain and the United States led to a situation in which 
the HBC could choose to help Great Britain keep the territory and to make decisions with 
their own profits and advantage in mind, rather than with any regard for the future state of 
the Snake Country environment. This situation made the very idea of a fur desert policy 
possible. It would not make sense on land that belonged indisputably to the Company and 
from which competition had been excluded, such as New Caledonia, what is now British 
Columbia. 
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The same connection holds true for the social relations that characterized the 
Oregon Country trade. The strict hierarchy between classes of employees, the racial or 
ethnic divisions between these classes, and the periphery status of women all carry over 
from other sectors of the trade. Across Canada, the HBC maintained strict class and 
gender divisions. In the Snake River Expeditions, as elsewhere, this type of social system 
included both positive and negative consequences for the HBC. The Expeditions 
succeeded in large part because the social structure maintained order and efficiency, as 
with their use of women's labor. However, maintaining a social hierarchy requires an 
underclass, the Métis freemen, who resisted their inferior status. They defected to 
American trapping companies, resisted rules regarding their behavior, especially those 
that applied to trading with local Indians for horses, refused at times to follow Peter 
Skene Ogden's directions to follow him into hostile territory, and generally made life 
difficult for Ogden. 
Finally, the status of the West in general and the Northwest in particular as a 
resource supplier for Europe and the East Coast begins with the fur trade carried out by 
the British. The Company had no interest in settling the region or developing a society 
there, a disadvantage to them in the territorial dispute. Instead, they saw the region as a 
source of raw materials with which they could develop their own wealth and that of 
English citizens in Europe. This attitude defined their purpose in establishing themselves 
in the West and determined how they would manage the harvest of the natural resources. 
This relationship between the West and the rest of the world had consequences not only 
for the land but also for the people living on the land. The policy disrupted native 
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communities' subsistence systems both as a result of trapping out the beaver and through 
their economic relations with the British. 
Mention beavers to an urban dweller today and the response invariably reflects 
their frustration with how the rodents block culverts, chew through wires, and outwit 
many a clever attempt to exclude them from backyard creeks and roadside ditches. But 
out in the hinterlands, people have begun ever so slowly to welcome beaver back to areas 
where their dams can reverse damage done by farming, mining, and grazing. Over the last 
few years the beaver have regained some of their pre-fur trade populations levels and 
people have rediscovered their role in the ecosystems of Snake Country. Few, if any, of 
these people understand the relatively recent increase in beaver populations as the latest 
stage in a sequence set off by the fur desert policy. Likewise, George Simpson, governor 
the HBC in North America, probably did not consider the future consequences of the 
Snake Country Expeditions. Who would guess the small, pudgy, sedentary beaver would 
be the center of so much activity and change? 
Notes 
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Chapter One 
"If properly managed no question exists that it would yield handsome profits as we have 
convincing proof that the country is a rich preserve of Beaver and which for political 
reasons we should endeavor to destroy as fast as possible." 
- George Simpson, Governor of the Northern Department of Hudson's Bay Company' 
"A melancholy and strange-looking country - one of fracture, and violence, and fire." 
- John C. Fremont, American explorer^ 
Peter Skene Ogden, chief factor of the Snake Country Expeditions in the latter 
half of the 1820s, spared no complaint in his journal entries describing the landscape he 
traversed. If his surrounding merited any mention it usually resembled his remarks made 
near the confluence of Burnt Creek and the Snake River: "Indeed a more Gloomy Barren 
looking Country I have never yet seen."^ Or, more often, he might mention the number of 
beaver to be expected according to the vegetation of an area. 
Ogden's focus on beaver and on moving through the country quickly caused him 
to mistake the richly varied landscape with very little space that was truly hostile to 
human habitation for a wasteland. Snake Country, the landscape traversed by trappers and 
inhabited by numerous small communities of people in what is now primarily central and 
southern Idaho, southeastern Washington, and northeastern Oregon varies widely in 
elevation, climate, vegetation, and landforms. There are pockets of high mountains, 
rolling grasslands, and lava plains scattered over the area that was mostly covered with 
sagebrush plains when the HBC arrived in the 1820s. These widely divergent landscapes 
are drawn together into one region because they share in one common trait: they are all 
drained by the Snake-Colimibia River system. 
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Figure 1.1. Physiographic Regions of Snake Country 
Slate Boundaries 
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Volcanic and hydrologie forces have created the Snake Country topography. Lava 
flows have laid layers of basalt across the plains. About 16,000 years ago, Lake 
Bonneville, the much larger. Pleistocene version of the Great Salt Lake, filled to its 
highest level, about 800 feet. It remained more or less at that height for about 1000 years 
until the water broke through the rock and ice holding it back at Red Rock Canyon and 
flooded the Snake River valley all the way to the Columbia River. The immense amount 
of water rushing downstream gouged the basalt and swept away soil and rock. Since this 
catastrophic event tributaries to the Snake and Columbia have continued to cut down 
through the basalt, in some places to such an extent the plains look wrinkled from the air. 
By the time the British arrived in Snake Country it had developed into two 
separate but similar regions. Around the lower Snake and middle Columbia rivers, the 
Columbia Plateau climate predominated. The Plateau climate varied less than the Great 
Basin to the south and generally experienced less severe extremes of weather and climate 
cycles. The upper Snake Basin, what is now primarily southern Idaho, exists on the 
peripheries of the Plateau and the Great Basin, resulting in a drier climate that is more 
susceptible to the highly variable climate of the Great Basin but still buffered by the 
influence of the Plateau.'' 
Precipitation rates on the Plateau depend largely on elevation. Generally, the 
lower elevations receive less precipitation. Conversely, the higher elevations have higher 
rates of precipitation. The Cascade Mountains to the west capture most of the moisture 
moving inland from the Pacific Ocean. The mountain ranges in eastern Oregon and Idaho 
stop some of the remaining precipitation from escaping to the Rockies in the east, but the 
16 
valleys have to rely on the snowpack for most of their water. The lowest levels hover 
around ten inches per year in places such as The Dalles, at an elevation of 96 feet. The 
Wallowa Mountains of northeastern Oregon and the Lemhi Range of central Idaho 
receive approximately 60 inches per year, but their valleys and canyons average only ten 
to twenty inches like the Dalles.^ 
The topographical relief that influences the precipitation makes for a complex 
map of landforms and vegetation. East of the Cascade Mountain range, south of the 
Columbia River, and west of the Blue Mountains lies the Deschutes-Umatilla Plain, 
bounded on the south by the High Lava Plains of south-central Oregon. Its lowest points 
are along the Columbia River at about 250 feet and the highest is 3000 feet in the western 
uplands around Madras, Oregon. At lower elevations, before white Americans settled the 
area, tall bunchgrasses dominated. In the mountains, ponderosa pines take advantage of 
the greater availability of water. ® 
The Blue Mountains region encompasses veilleys (such as the Nez Perce's Grande 
Ronde), mountains, and plateaus. The elevations range from 900 feet to almost 10,000 
feet. The largest plateau, the Snake River Plateau, forms the uplands through which the 
Snake River cuts a mile deep canyon. Most valleys are not so abrupt, but they are deep 
and protected enough to get only ten inches of precipitation and only support vegetation 
well adapted to dry climates, such as sagebrush. Moving upward in elevation, the 
dominant vegetation changes in response to higher precipitation rates from sagebrush to 
juniper, into Douglas fir, lodgepole pine, white fir, and western larch woodlands.' 
To the north, the Palouse Region of southeastern Washington contrasts sharply 
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with the Blue Mountains. These rolling hills rise only 20 to 80 feet above the surrounding 
plains. The area is subhumid and, prior to white settlement and agriculture, long grasses 
and ponderosa pine forests flourished. Today, the Palouse produce abundant crops for 
farmers because of their rich soil and sufficient precipitation. 
Just to the west of the Palouse, in Idaho, the Snake River Plateau of the Blue 
Mountains gives way to the forested foothills of the Northern Rockies. The Rockies of 
central Idaho consist of high mountains with low valleys throughout the ranges, which 
include the Lemhi and Salmon ranges. The mountains, like those farther west, have 
subhumid higher elevations with spruce, fir, and ponderosa pines, and semiarid lowlands 
with sagebrush-grasslands. Three prairies in this region, the Camas Prairie, Big Camas, 
and Camas Meadow, provided a staple food, the camas root, to the Nez Perce, Northern 
Shoshone, and Barmock in the nineteenth century. Located close to the mountains, all 
three had a combination of good soils and adequate precipitation for camas to grow. 
Closer to Montana, the lower valleys become more arid, and the sagebrush-grasslands 
give way to sagebrush steppes.^ 
South of the Blue Mountains in the Malheur River and Boise, Idaho vicinity, the 
climate becomes decidedly drier and more uniform in the Owhyhee Upland. The soils are 
dry and support an even mix of sagebrush steppe areas and saltbrush/greasewood 
vegetation. Some of the higher elevations support trees, such as junipers, but these 
elevations are rare. The plateau is at 5000 feet, and the scattered mountains reach about 
8000 feet.® When Peter Skene Ogden crossed this region with his brigades of trappers he 
wrote, "I have only to remark a more barren Country no Christian ever traveled over."'° 
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Similar to the Owhyhee Upland but lower in elevation and more volcanic in 
structure and soil type, the Eastern Snake River Plains fill a wide swath through Idaho 
south of the mountain ranges. Lava flows from the Cenozoic era created the 60-mile wide 
plains that support sagebrush steppe where enough soil has formed through erosion and 
some sedimentation. There still remain pockets of land where the basalt has not 
disappeared at all under soil and no vegetation can live." 
The Snake River Plains formed part of the route people have used to travel 
between the Plateau and the Great Plains on foot, on horse, and in wagons, trains and 
cars. To early inhabitants of the basin, according to B. Robert Butler, the Snake River 
Plains were "a natural extension of the northwestern Plains west of the Continental 
Divide and.. .a corridor cormecting the northwestern [Great] Plains area with the 
Intermontane area."'^ The British quickly realized the importance of the Plains as a west-
east route that would draw Euro-Americans toward the Columbia Plateau and HBC 
operations. 
Finally, the southeastern comer of Idaho and the adjacent areas of Wyoming, 
Utah, and Nevada differ markedly from the Eastern Snake River Plains. In this region, the 
basins and ranges and the Yellowstone Plateau, the same pattern as in the Deschutes-
Umatilla Plateau eind the Blue Mountains prevails, with trees in the higher elevations and 
sagebrush and grasslands in the lowlands. Douglas fir, cedar, hemlock, spruce and fir 
make up the forests on the Yellowstone Plateau while the drier mountain ranges to the 
west have a mixture of vegetation that includes juniper woodlands, and spruce and fir 
forests. Between the ranges, such as the Wasatch, Albion, and Malad Mountains, which 
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run roughly parallel to each other, lie basins drained by the tributaries of the Snake River. 
Most of the vegetation of these open valleys is sagebrush steppe, but there are some areas 
of tall grasslands.'^ 
Living in this varied landscape in the early nineteenth century meant having a rich 
and highly mobile existence. Prior to the presence of inland fur traders the local 
communities had an extensive interregional trade network to augment their already well-
balanced subsistence systems. As the eighteenth century progressed, the Spanish and 
British cultures encountered the Columbia Plateau cultures first through trade. The 
cultural changes this contact brought do not seem to have been drastic. The presence of 
inland fiir traders at Hudson's Bay Company posts put additional pressures on both the 
land and the people. While the fur traders and trappers were certainly agents of change, 
they also operated within an existing social and economic system they only partially 
comprehended. 
A number of cultural groups lived in the region involved in the Snake Country 
Expeditions. The Cayuse, Nez Perce, Northern Shoshone, and Bannock lived in the areas 
most affected by the fur desert policy. Fur traders and explorers in the region usually 
mistakenly lumped the Northern Shoshone, and Barmock together as "Snakes" or 
"Diggers." The territory in which these communities lived covers to the two 
physiographic provinces discussed above - the Columbia Plateau and the periphery of the 
Great Basin. In response to these different climates, the people developed two similar but 
distinct rhythms of life. 
The earliest predecessors of these people probably arrived about 11,000 years ago. 
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when the area held more fresh water than it does today. Then, about 6000 years ago, 
during a period of climate change, the Altithermal of 7500 to 4500 years ago, the area 
became a destination for people one author has described as "dust bowl refugees" from 
the Great Basin. The first Shoshonean moved north about 3700 years ago from the 
Southwest.''' 
The Plateau cultures' utilization of resources led them to develop a sort of "hub-
and-spoke" movement pattern. The Cayuse and the Nez Perce who lived on the Snake 
and Columbia rivers below present-day Lewiston maintained semi-permanent villages. 
Salmon fishing locations determined the positioning of the villages. During different 
seasons of resource availability, small groups of Nez Perce or Cayuse from the villages 
moved about the countryside to root grounds such as Camas Prairie, hunting grounds, or 
trading centers. They returned to the river villages for the salmon runs and winter camps. 
The balance in the gathering-fishing-hunting diet demonstrates the relative importance of 
their subsistence activities. The Nez Perce, for example, relied on plant foods for 40 to 
60% of their diet, salmon for as much as 50%, and game animals for about 10 to 15%, 
depending on the year and where a group lived. 
The salmon runs and root gathering influenced many aspects of life on the 
Plateau. The villages and people who lived in them gained their names from their 
segment of the river, such as Kamiah. Traveling to root grounds and then gathering the 
camas, biscuitroot, and berries filled the summers. Furthermore, Plateau technology 
evolved in relation to their primary subsistence activities. Men developed weirs, knives, 
spears, and other fish catching and processing tools. Women fashioned digging sticks out 
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of a curved piece of wood with a handle attached to the top, for leverage, and containers 
to aid in gathering, preparing, and storing roots, stems, leaves and fruits of edible and 
medicinal plants. Some members of the Cayuse and Nez Perce joined Northern Shoshone 
and the mountain groups, such as the Salish Flatheads of the Bitterroot Valley, when they 
crossed the Divide for the amiual bison hunt. The cultural implications and reasons for 
the hunt have not been entirely sorted out, as the discussion of the consequences of the 
fur desert policy will demonstrate. 
The salmon runs halted at Shoshone Falls, just upstream from present-day Twin 
Falls, Idaho. As the land sloped upward and eastward on the Snake River Plains it looked 
more and more like a desert as the climate became drier. Irrigated farms today obscure 
the desert-like landscape. Depending on where they lived, the upriver Nez Perce, 
Northern Shoshone, and Bannock developed variations on a balance between a reliance 
on roots and berries, salmon, local game animals, and bison. In the east mounted 
Northern Shoshone and Bannock groups in the Lemhi Mountains, near present-day Fort 
Hall, and in the central Snake River Plains shifted the balance the farthest away from 
gathering-fishing to gathering-hunting. Across the region, spring and summer activities 
focused on root gathering. Winters were spent hunting bison, elk, deer, antelope or 
mountain sheep. The toolkits that Northern Shoshone and Bannock people developed 
demonstrates their emphasis on gathering and hunting. As on the Plateau, women made 
digging sticks and containers to facilitate root gathering, processing and storing. The men 
carried bows, arrows, and game processing tools. 
As a result of a reduced reliance on fisheries and the semi-permanent villages they 
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supported, the upriver-Nez Perce, Northern Shoshone and Bannock people moved in 
more of a seasonal circuit. Small groups of people moved around the Snake River basin 
to seasonally available resources. In the winter there might be larger aggregations of 
people either for the bison hunt or at a campsite near good hunting grounds, but these 
camps had no permanency or continuity of members between or during seasons.'^ 
Because of the high variability of campsites and members, social groups did not 
identify themselves or others by place so much as by how they lived. The Northern 
Shoshone, for example, who lived in the mountains around the Salmon River hunted big 
horn sheep year round were known as the Tukadika, the "meat-eaters" or "eaters of big 
horn sheep." Camps on the Boise, Payette, and Weiser rivers gained the name 
Yahandeka, or "eaters of groundhogs."" 
There is not much evidence that any of these people needed beaver for their 
existence. Beaver meat is certainly edible and tribes most likely used it sporadically. 
Apparently, salmonids, roots, and large mammals provided enough sustenance to 
preclude the use of beaver for food. But the beaver could have been hunted more 
extensively for they lived everywhere people lived, gathered, and hunted. Only when the 
land offered no possibility of growing willows or another suitable wood plant did the 
beaver stay away completely. Because the fur desert policy severely reduced their 
numbers and white settlers did not encourage their rebound, no definite idea of beaver 
pre-contact numbers or range exists for the Snake River Basin. From the trappers' 
journals it appears they reproduced successfully in all parts of the Columbia Plateau 
except on parts of the eastern Snake River Plains and the Owhyhee Upland in present-day 
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central Oregon. These lava plains lacked soil and vegetation and therefore any habitat for 
beaver.^" 
Intertribal and interregional trade played an important role among the people of 
the Columbia Plateau. In the early nineteenth century, these groups had an extensive trade 
network that added variation and stability to their lifeways. Two places served as the 
centers of trade. One, at The Dalles on the Columbia, brought the coastal and the inland 
people together. Each region brought their specialties to trade. The Northern Shoshone 
could trade bear grass, camas roots, buffalo robes and other skins for pemmican from the 
Middle Columbia peoples or for metal goods from the coastal groups who had acquired 
from the Europeans trading on the Pacific Coast. Another trading center, in the area 
where the Boise, Payette and Snake rivers meet, brought Plains people together with the 
Plateau groups from the area west of the Divide. From the Plains, groups such as the 
Crow and Arapaho brought tipis, headdresses, cedar poles, parfleches, and other Plains 
goods. Some groups traded ftirs in this pre-contact network. The Cayuse sent out small 
groups that trapped a variety of small mammals for their furs for trade. The Cayuse linked 
the Plains tribes and the trading center at The Dalles.^' 
The trade network also brought the first great consequences for the Snake River 
tribes of the European presence in North America. After the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, the 
horses "transferred" to native ownership made their way northward by way of long-
established trade routes. The first horses reached the Snake River Basin by 1730, possibly 
as early as 1700. A large number of the people adopted the horse into their lifeways. 
Horses brought a whole new means of measuring wealth and transporting goods to the 
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Northwest. They could carry heavier things, including more raw materials and routes 
between trading centers shortened because horses could travel overland, independent of 
waterways.^^ 
Horse ownership had a particularly significant impact on the bison-hunting bands. 
With horses, they could travel farther in search of herds, stay longer, and transport more 
bison meat and other Plains products back across the Continental Divide. The horse-
owning groups traded their surplus herds, giving them an advantage back on the Plateau 
where these goods were in demand. The term "cayuse" denoted ponies on the Plains 
because the Cayuse traded large numbers for goods from the Plains at the Grande Ronde 
rendezvous. This would later benefit the Hudson's Bay Company, who relied on the local 
supply of horses for transport and sometimes for food when they could not find game 
animals.^^ 
Although beaver played only a minor role as a source of subsistence on the 
Plateau, they would not remain insignificant for long. Beginning in the early 1800s, 
Europeans began to get an inkling that the Columbia Plateau held resources that could be 
used to make those wealthy who were adventurous enough to bring the pelts to markets in 
Asia and Europe. The Europeans did not try to fit into the seasonal rounds or the trade 
network as it existed among the tribes. Instead, they operated within the region in terms 
of what circumstances in Europe and eastern North America predicated. From the early 
yeeirs of contact to the present, people from the outside have disregarded the Snake River 
Basin as a place with a particular ecosystem and existing cultures, and treated it as space 
that existed for people to draw what they wanted from it. The market created the 
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circumstances to which they adapted, not the local environment. 
Different European nations began the dance of competing claims long before the 
beavers lured tie Hudson's Bay Company to the region. The Russians searched the far 
northern seas and lands for natural wealth starting in the 1740s and the Spanish poked 
their curious noses into the waterways as early as 1774. The Americans sent their ships 
sailing around the Horn, as did the British, in the 1790's. A badly confused situation (to 
everyone except the locals) resulted in a land that filled European and Euro-American fur 
traders with hopes of immeasurable wealth. 
By the early 1820s lines had been drawn by Britain and the United States, the 
only remaining outside powers after a series of deals excluded the Spanish and Russians 
from the argument. The Spaniards abandoned their hopes in 1819 to the Adams-Onis 
treaty with the United States. The Russians initially tried to join forces with John Jacob 
Astor's Pacific Fur Company. When that failed, they attempted to assert their rights to the 
Northwest Coast with Czar Alexander's Ukase of 1821, which prohibited all foreign 
vessels from approaching the coast. Both the United States eind Great Britain 
subsequently asserted their claims and the Russian government chose not to press the 
issue. Unfortunately, the British and American claims overlapped in some key areas. 
Both countries wanted the area bounded by the Columbia River on the south and east, the 
Pacific Ocean on the west, and the 49th parallel on the north. Although the future 
President Polk would draw far wider sights in the election of 1844, from 1818 until the 
final resolution of the issue in 1846, the primary disagreement rested on access to the 
potential ports of Puget Sound and to the transportation route provided by the Columbia 
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River.^'' 
The land rights of any of the people already living in Oregon Country did not 
enter into the international debate. In 1846, Travers Twiss wrote a defense of the British 
claim to the region in which he briefly considered native land tenure, but in terms of who 
had the right to dispossess the locals of their land. He wrote. 
The practice of European nations has certainly recognised in the nation which has 
first occupied the territory of savage tribes, that live by hunting, fishing, and 
roaming habits, the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives by purchase, 
or cession, or conquest, for the purpose of establishing settlements. The more 
humane spirit of the modem code of nations seems disposed to reduce this right to 
a right of pre-emption, as against other European nations.^' 
Settlements established the nation's possession of the country, in European eyes. The 
only legal recognition of native land tenure was the rewarding of rights to European 
nations to dispossess them by any means necessary.^® 
As seemingly clear as Twiss portrays the designation of land ownership, the 
realities of the local situation in Snake Country made the process far more complicated 
and balanced between the parties involved. The HBC did not explicitly gain access to 
Snake Country for furs, but for the places where they established posts, the local people 
required recognition of their control of that land and compensation for the use of it. 
Without these posts, the Company would not have been able to carry on the fur trade. 
When the North West Company began to build Fort Walla Walla (later named Fort Nez 
Perces) the local people congregated at the site. They wanted to obtain payment for the 
trees the North West Company had cut for construction of the fort and to make it clear to 
the British that they would not be allowed to hunt or fish. Through negotiations, Donald 
Mckenzie reached an agreement with the chiefs. 
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According to Theodore Stem, the bands around Fort Nez Perces still considered the land 
and the driftwood from the river their own; the Europeans only had use-rights. Likewise, 
at Fort Col ville, the HBC made a verbal treaty with a local chief that allowed use of the 
land but prohibited use of the fishery at Kettle Falls.^' The Governor and Committee, the 
governing body of the HBC, recognized the importance of assuring the people in the 
Columbia District of their intentions to respect local land tenure. They instructed George 
Simpson in 1825 to make it clear to the native people, "that we have no desire to posses 
or cultivate their lands beyond the little garden at the Trading houses."^^ Disregarding 
prior claims by native inhabitants worked fine on an international level, but not locally. 
Though the Americans argued otherwise, their claim to the area lacked any 
substantial support. The first, Captain Robert Gray's discovery of the mouth of the 
Columbia in 1792, was not backed up by settlement until 1810. That settlement, John 
Jacob Astor's Fort Astoria formed the Americans' second shaky support. It lacked much 
strength because an employee had sold Fort Astoria to the British before it was 
"captured" by them during the War of 1812. Through some impressive persistence by 
Astor and some diplomatic maneuvering, the Americans reclaimed the post according to 
the provisions of the Treaty of Ghent (1814) that required all captured property be 
returned to pre-War of 1812 owners. This support to the claim may have held more 
weight had the Americans not reclaimed the fort by merely posting a plaque and raising 
an American flag at the site before sailing off again. The Lewis and Clark Expedition's 
stay in the valley during 1805 and 1806 provided the final support of the American claim. 
Though they did not leave any basis of a settlement either, the expedition did explore and 
28 
nominally claim the region for the United States?' 
In 1825, Senator Thomas Hart Benton added several more supports to the claim. 
The Louisiana Purchase provided the argument for contiguity as it ended at the crest of 
the Rocky Mountains, the eastern boundary of the disputed territory. The Adams-Om's 
Treaty of 1819 with Spain ceded the region north of the 42nd parallel to the United 
States. These added to the American argument, but not to any extent that clearly 
outweighed any of the British arguments for their claim. More than anything else, the 
Monroe Doctrine and the idea of Manifest Destiny added momentum to the American 
claim. As time progressed, the facts of the American claim came up in speeches to the 
Senate or House less and the idea that the Oregon Country was American country 
because it was part of North America and the American destiny included their 
sovereignty stretching from sea to sea entered the discussion more and more.^° 
The British had fewer but more substantial supports for their claim to Oregon 
Country. First, Captain George Vancouver explored the Puget Sound extensively in 1792, 
giving English names to most of the landforms in sight of his ship. Second, the North 
West Company, and then the Hudson's Bay Company after the North West Company 
merged with the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821, had small settlements throughout the 
region, such as: Spokane House (1810), Fort Okanagan (1811), and Fort Walla Walla 
(1818). Finally, the Nootka Convention of 1790 with Spain granted rights of access 
anywhere north of the Spanish California settlements to the British. They did not want to 
lose access to Puget Sound or to the Columbia River because of the fur trade and a sense 
of empire held dear by the British Crown and public.^' 
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Although the British publicly held that their claim to the region south of the 
Columbia River was legitimate, they did not expect to retain those lands once an actual 
settlement was reached. They did expect, however, to retain the area north of the 
Columbia. The settlement they sought in the dispute with the Americans was a 
continuation of the 49° parallel from the Continental Divide (the accepted boundary to 
that point) to its intersection with the Columbia and then following that river to its mouth 
at the Pacific Ocean. They remained adamant throughout the nearly thirty years of the 
dispute about maintaining their rights to the Columbia, as it was the only navigable river 
out of the rich fur territory of the Northern Rockies and New Caledonia—what is now 
British Columbia. 
The first attempt to settle the Oregon Question did not address the core of the 
dispute: who held sovereignty over the region? Instead, the negotiators who produced the 
Convention of 1818 limited their agreement to use rights. They worked out a set of rules 
that appeared on paper to be fair and reasonable to both parties but that proved to benefit 
the Hudson's Bay Company far more than anyone else once applied to the actual situation 
in the Columbia River basin. 
The agreement between the two countries is short and part of a larger set of 
negotiations concluded in the Convention of 1818. Only Article III pertains to the Oregon 
Question. It reads: 
It is agreed, that any Country that may be claimed by either Party on the North 
West Coast of America, Westward of the Stony Mountains, shall, together with 
it's (sic) Harbours, Bays, and Creeks, and the Navigation of all Rivers within the 
same, be free and open, for the term of ten years from the date of the Signature of 
the Present Convention, to the Vessels, Citizens, and Subject[s] of the Two 
30 
Powers: it being well understood, that this Agreement is not to be construed to the 
Prejudice of any Claim, which either of the Two High Contracting Parties may 
have to any part of said Country, nor shall it be taken to affect the Claims of any 
other Power or State to any Part of the said Country; the only object of the High 
Contracting Parties, in that respect, being to prevent disputes and differences 
amongst Themselves/^ 
Despite the relative lack of importance of the area for the British in 1818, their 
negotiators held tenaciously to their rights to the region. The American negotiators wrote 
in the message conveying papers relating to the negotiations that. 
The importance which seems to have been attached to that subject [the Oregon 
Question] by Great Britain induces a belief that it will again be brought forward, 
at some future occasion, with a view to a definitive arrangement.^^ 
The American correspondence, on the other hand, put no great weight on the Oregon 
lands. The other issues resolved by the Convention - impressment, the slave trade, 
fisheries in international waters, and neutrality - garnered more attention from the 
American side. The two countries renewed the Convention in 1827 for an indefinite 
period because no settlement could be reached. In the years leading up to 1846 the British 
strengthened their stance, and the issue moved to the top of the American agenda.^'' 
In 1818 the Hudson's Bay Company only had a potential interest in the region. 
More pressing matters preoccupied them in the eastern Canada. The North West 
Company had established itself as the most effective opposition to the Hudson's Bay 
Company's monopoly of the fur trade in Canada. Formed by fur traders out of Montreal, 
the North West Company had been fighting an effective war over trapping grounds with 
the Hudson's Bay Company that devastated beaver populations across central and eastern 
Canada and sometimes led to human bloodshed. Surely the Company looked west to the 
rich fur trapping grounds of Oregon Country and New Caledonia. In 1818, however, the 
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only British who occupied the Oregon Country worked as trappers and traders for the 
North West Company. 
The extent to which the fur desert policy can be considered Crown policy depends 
on whether implicit approval constitutes a policy. The British government never 
prohibited the HBC from carrying out the fur desert policy even though it potentially 
could endanger Anglo-American relations. But, to the North West Company and the 
HBC, the British government could be fhistratingly dismissive regarding the Columbia 
River and surrounding fur trading regions. The British Parliament, public, and press 
remained nearly silent on the Oregon Question until the 1840s.^' When the Americans 
pressed for the return of Astoria at the 1818 Convention negotiations. Lord Castlereagh, 
the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, decided, according to Frederick Merk, "to 
maintain the status quo."^^ Circumstances in England following years of war and their 
desire to keep Anglo-American relations friendly prevented the British from pressing 
their claim to Oregon Country too strongly.^' 
Fortunately for the HBC, the Governor and Committee had connections to and 
within the government. Edward Ellice, one of the Company's partners, held a seat in 
Parliament. J.H. Pelly, the HBC's governor, and the Committee in England had access to 
diplomatic papers and decision-making at the Foreign Office. Finally, George Carming, 
the British foreign secretary from 1822 to 1827, strongly supported maintaining a British 
presence on the west coast of North America. The Company chose to pressure members 
of the Cabinet who favored their presence in Oregon Country, such as Canning, while 
carrying out policies, such as the fur desert, that furthered their own interests.^^ 
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The North West Company merged into the HBC in 1821, ending years of conflict. 
At that point, the Oregon Country gained new importance to the Company. The inter­
company conflict had devastated beaver trapping grounds to the east of the Rockies. The 
North West Company had trapped in the Columbia River area, but mostly closer to the 
coast and in more northern areas. They sent brigades to the Snake River Country starting 
in 1818 but they had to spend too much time defending themselves against hostile groups 
of Blackfeet to bring in many beaver pelts.^' 
The HBC took over operations in the area in 1821, but made few changes. First, 
the Company questioned whether the Columbia District merited the effort required to 
keep it. The Company's governing committee in London wrote to George Simpson, 
governor of the Northern Department in February 1822, 
We understand that hitherto the trade of the Columbia has not been profitable, and 
fi-om all that we have learnt on the Subject we afe not sanguine in our 
expectations of being able to make it so in the future. But if by any improved 
management the loss can be reduced to a small sum, it is worth a serious 
consideration, whether it may not be a good policy to hold possession of that 
country, with a view of protecting the more valuable district to the North of it."" 
Also, Americans had begun to reach the Northern Rockies in substantial numbers. The 
Committee wrote to the Chief factors of the Columbia Department in September of 1822, 
We have likewise to notice an extract from an American paper (No. 6 enclosed) 
of a party of 180 persons having left the Missouri for an expedition across the 
Rocky Mountains towards the Columbia. As well as the intention of the American 
Government to form a settlement at the Columbia, You will be very particular in 
transmitting every information, if any steps have been taken by the Americans to 
carry either of these plans into effect; and we depend on your strenuous exertions 
to secure the Fur trade to Great Britain by your liberality to and kind treatment of 
the Natives.'" 
While the Company knew the area south of the Columbia would be lost to the 
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Americans, they planned on keeping the lands north of the river. The prospect of 
competing with Americans in these lands did not appeal to the Governor and Committee 
in England, nor to George Simpson. Their experiences across Canada had taught them a 
painful lesson: when the monopoly was undermined by competition, the beaver trapping 
grounds (and tlierefore profits) suffered immensely. 
From the early days forward competition had led to overtrapping. The height of 
the opposition firom 1758 to 1821 destroyed the beaver colonies of central Canada. The 
evidence of decline appears throughout the records of returns for the early nineteenth 
century. The 1822-1823 Lac La Pluie report relayed that the beaver had been exhausted 
for some time in the region. By 1820 Fort Dauphin experienced a scarcity of beaver. In 
the returns from the Lower Red River in 1804, 2868 pounds of beaver pelts were brought 
out of the region; by 1808 the returns dwindled to 908 pounds. The total numbers of 
beaver pelts taken out of the United States and Canada prior to 1821 also show the effects 
of this overtrapping. In 1765, 66,664 pelts went to market. In 1802,140,000 beavers lost 
their lives and their furs. Then, in 1820, only 56,000 let curiosity lead them to their 
demise in steel traps baited with castoreum. With this recent past in mind, the Company 
prepared to deter Americans from reaching even the periphery of their beaver preserves in 
New Caledonia."^ 
Their plan of defense consisted of creating a buffer zone out of the Snake River 
Basin and the area that is now the state of Oregon. That territory, if made unattractive to 
American trappers, would turn potential competitors away before they neared richer 
preserves. The Committee wrote to John D. Cameron, Chief Factor of the Columbia 
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District in 1824: 
It is likewise desirable that the Post at Walla Walla should be made as respectable 
as possible, as well as any others on the North Side of the River, and as we 
cannot expect to have a more Southern boundary than the Columbia in any 
Treaty with the Americans (altho' we are entitled to it from occupancy) it will 
be very desirable that the hunters should get as much out of the Snake Country 
as possible for the next few years/^ 
In contrast to places north of the river, the land to the south of the Columbia held no long-
term value to the Company. But the idea of making a buffer zone out of less productive 
regions is not unique to the Columbia Department. In the February 1822 letter from the 
Committee to Simpson, they wrote. 
The Russians are endeavoring to set up claims in the North West Coast of 
America as low as Latitude 51, and we think it desirable to extend our trading 
posts as far to the West and North from Eraser's River in Caledonia, as may be 
practicable, if there appears any reasonable prospect of doing so profitably.'*'' 
Also, in the 1820's the Ottawa River region formed a frontier that protected the interior 
trade of Canada from American interest and interference.'*' 
While the Committee advocated getting "as much out of the Snake Country as 
possible for the next few years," George Simpson carried the idea one step further and 
wrote in his 1824 journal entry (meant for Committee eyes) that, "If properly managed no 
question exists that it would yield handsome profits as we have convincing proof that the 
country is a rich preserve of Beaver and which for political reasons we should endeavor 
to destroy as fast as possible.'"*® He made the decision after visiting the region to 
determine its usefulness to the HBC. There the fur desert policy began. While the 
Committee envisioned the economic and political benefits of heavy trapping in the 
Columbia District, Simpson focused the brigades' efforts on trapping the region. 
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especially the Snake River Baisin, clear of beaver. Simpson knew the river would be the 
conduit for Americans moving westward to trap. 
Without the circumstances created by the Convention of 1818, the reason for the 
fur desert policy would not have existed. Without George Simpson the idea of the fur 
desert most likely would not have existed. Few people in the Company seem to have had 
the initiative, focus on profits, and generally ruthless personality to conceive of such an 
effort. But for Simpson, the policy fits in with other decisions he made. Unlike most other 
officials in the Company, Simpson did not work his way up through the ranks of the fiir 
trade. He entered the trade as governor of the Northern Department, an area that covered 
roughly the northern half of the Company's holding in North America and the territory 
west of the Rockies. As a teenager, Simpson earned a reputation as having an astute 
business mind. He worked as a clerk at a sugar brokerage firm in London owned by a 
partnership that included his uncle and Andrew Wedderbum. Wedderbum bought stock 
in the HBC in 1808 and was elected to the governing committee in 1810. When the 
Committee began looking for a new governor after the merger of the North West 
Company and HBC in 1821, Wedderbum recommended Simpson for the post. Simpson 
had the requisite business acumen and the personal fortitude to handle the post-merger 
economic and personnel situations. Also, Simpson served as insurance against the 
possibility that the Crown might arrest the Southern Department governor, William 
Williams. Williams had not always considered the legality of his tactics against the North 
West Company as important as their effectiveness.'*' 
The Committee made a fortunate choice from a business perspective. Simpson 
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had intelligence, vigor, and resolve that served him well as governor. He earned the 
respect of his subordinates early. When he and Doctor John McLoughlin set out for the 
Columbia District from York Factory on Hudson Bay in 1824, Simpson gave 
McLoughlin twenty-day head start. In six weeks Simpson overtook McLoughlin, arriving 
in his camp in time for breakfast. Applying his business sense to the Company's financial 
situation, Simpson worked to decrease costs and increase profits. In the short time 
between his appointment in 1822 and 1825, Simpson cut the number of Company 
employees from 1,983 people to 827. At the same time he dropped wages for ordinary 
employees (or, recommended the Committee do so) by 50%.'*^ 
Simpson considered the Company's operations in Snake Country in the same 
manner that he looked at the Company's human "resources" and took the necessary 
actions to make the business more lucrative and secure. The fur desert policy follows 
logically from this premise. Excluding competition insured the Company would remain 
profitable. 
In his personal life, Simpson did not gain the same admiration. Upstaging 
McLoughlin in front of his subordinates, cutting wages, and dropping the woman he had 
married à la façon du pays^^ for a British woman did not help his cold, self-involved 
reputation. Descriptions of him reflect awe, not affection or admiration. His biographer 
wrote, "throughout his forty years in the service Simpson subordinated any 
considerations of humanity to the welfare of the charter company."^" 
The Committee in London agreed with Simpson's plan, caring little for his 
personal foibles as long as they did not affect business. The first Snake Country 
Expedition started out in 1823 under Alexander Ross. It brought in 4000 pelts. The next 
expedition, led by Peter Skene Ogden, began the serious effort at clearing the region of 
beaver. Over the next six years, Ogden's expeditions would trap about 18,000 beaver in 
the area south of the Columbia. Although later eclipsed by the changes wrought by white 
Americans, the fur desert policy stands as an example of what values and actions the 
market economy brought to the West and the extreme results that could occur.^' 
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Chapter Two 
"This day 11 Beaver 1 Otter we have now ruined this quarter we may prepare to start." 
- Peter Skene Ogden, 1825-1826 Snake Country Expedition' 
In the middle of the 1825-1826 Snake Country Expedition, in May 1826, 
Expedition leader Peter Skene Ogden recorded his evaluation of the previous four months 
in the journal he kept for the governing Committee. He wrote, 
I certainly from the different accounts and reports I had received expected to find 
the South Side [of the Snake River] as rich in Beaver as the North side formerly 
was particularly as it had never been examined or Trapp'd by any Party, but we 
are convinced of the contrary which [h]as caused us serious loss of time.^ 
Ogden's disappointment lay not in the lack of profits but in the time he wasted on the 
southern side of the Snake River. Considered from a narrow, local view, to declare time 
wasted seems unwarranted. Ogden's party had accomplished quite a feat. In the four 
months they had traveled 650 miles over dry, rough country. Even though the brigades 
trapped just 1425 beaver, half of what they had taken in other, better, beaver territory, 
they cleared the country of beaver. Beaver did not inhabit the area extensively because 
the available water and habitat did not support large populations. Only a little over one-
half of the streams had water year-round. The brigades succeeded in their purpose, so it is 
surprising Ogden would considered the Expedition's activities there a loss. 
Yet Ogden's frustration permeates the journal entry and when his situation is 
viewed in the larger context of international dispute, his judgment gains validity. Two 
pressures bearing on him influenced his attitude: the imminent arrival of American 
trappers and the vastness of the territory to be trapped clear of beaver. Looking back over 
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the late winter and early spring of 1826, Ogden realized he should have spent the time in 
better beaver territory. Fur traders had not explored large parts of Snake Country by 
1826. As far as Ogden knew the rest of the region held populations like the one the Snake 
Country Expedition had exploited in 1824-25 in what is now western Montana and the 
Bear River Valley. They took 3152 beaver from that region in just four months. If he had 
spent his time in territories like the southern side of the Snake enough beaver would have 
remained to entice the Americans and the fiir desert policy would have failed.^ 
In retrospect, Ogden need not have been concerned. As he explored the region 
over the next several years, as far south as the Gulf of California, he realized that much of 
it lacked extensive beaver habitat and focused his efforts on those areas with substantial 
beaver populations. The combined effects of the Expeditions' efficient and disciplined 
efforts and beaver biology resulted in the near extirpation of Snake Country beaver and 
the success of the fur desert policy in keeping the Americans out of the Snake Country 
and New Caledonia fur trade. 
Prior to the HBC's occupation of the Northwest, British and American fur trade 
companies had trapped the rivers and streams throughout the area. A handful of 
expeditions made it into Snake Country. As early as 1810 trappers harassed the beaver 
colonies there. Andrew Henry, an American, led a party of men through the Upper Snake 
River area for the Missouri Company but failed to establish themselves in the trade due to 
the harsh winter weather. The Astorians also arrived in 1810. The British North West 
Company sent brigades into the country to the south of the Columbia River in 1819 under 
Donald McKenzie, but the Blackfeet made it too dangerous to trap many furs. Michel 
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Bourdon in 1822 and Finan McDonald in 1823 had similar experiences in the Snake 
Country. By the time the HBC arrived, people knew the potential wealth of the region but 
had failed to find a way to exploit it." 
Alexander Ross led the first HBC Snake Country Expedition in 1823, before the 
fur desert policy had been fully communicated to the traders in the Columbia District. He 
set out to exploit the beaver populations, but not necessarily to clear them entirely. 
George Simpson thought Ross was "empty headed" and ranted, 
This important duty [the Expeditions] should not be left to a self sufficient empty 
headed man like Ross who feels no further interest therein than in as far as it 
secures to him a SaF of £120 p Armum and whose reports are so full of bombast 
and marvelous nonsense that it is impossible to get any information that can be 
depended on from him.^ 
Although he brought in 154 packhorses loaded with beaver pelts, Ross also brought a 
group of Americans, including Jedediah Smith of the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, 
back to Flathead House, thus showing the Americans the way through the mountains. 
Ross may not have deserved Simpson's tirade, but he certainly disappointed the 
Company's hopes. 
Simpson replaced Ross with Peter Skene Ogden, a former North West Company 
trader. From his first expedition in 1824-25 to his last in 1829-30, Ogden established the 
foundation for the fur desert. Even though some of his expeditions turned into 
"explorations," he cleared Snake Country of beaver to the point that it no longer could 
support financial ventures by Americans in the Rockies. 
At 34, when he led his first Snake Country Expedition, Ogden already had 
considerable experience in the fur trade and in facing competition. The son of a 
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prominent Montreal judge, Ogden chose to enter the fur trade rather than continue on 
with his education to study law At 16, he worked for John Jacob Astor as a clerk in the 
American Fur Company's Montreal operations. In 1810, about the time Simpson entered 
his uncle's sugar brokerage firm, Ogden joined the North West Company, also as a clerk. 
This involved him immediately in the competition with the HBC.^ 
At He â la Crosse, his first post, Ogden and another North West Company 
employee, Samuel Black, harassed the HBC. He and Black climbed into the nearby HBC 
fort, hung around outside it showing off their pistols and knives, and terrorized Peter 
Fidler, who was in charge of the fort. The next spring, Fidler sent his men to Churchill 
Factory. Ogden and some North West Company trappers stayed just ahead of them for a 
week, intercepting the trade with the local Native Americans. In 1817 Ogden arrived in 
the Pacific Northwest and worked out of Fort George and Spokane House, where he met 
his wife Julia Rivet of the Nez Perce. ̂  
When the North West Company and the HBC merged in 1821, Ogden's past 
caught up with him. The HBC remembered his antics at He à la Crosse quite well. They 
did not include him in the new concern. In 1822 Ogden traveled to London to plead his 
case for reinstatement, which he achieved with the support of George Simpson in 1823.® 
Ogden set out on his first Expedition in 1824 full of high expectations. The day 
trappers caught the first beaver at the mouth of the Wild Horse River, Ogden vwrote, "This 
is a Commencement but I trust we shall not end ere we have Six Thous. owing to my 
ignorance of the Country I am bound to, with this number I shall be Contented if more 
they are heartily welcome."' The next six years spent in Snake Country would temper his 
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enthusiasm and expectations. Even when he came to know Snake Country, he never 
gained six thousand beaver and conditions tested his abilities as a leader and a fur trader. 
Each fall the Expeditions set out from Flathead Post or Fort Nez Perces to make a 
circular round through the territory to the south and west of the Columbia. (See maps for 
expedition routes.) Ogden explored large parts of the West for the HBC as he led his 
parties through what is now western Montana, central and southern Idaho, eastern 
Oregon, northern Nevada, and northwestern Utah. During the 1829-30 Expedition, Ogden 
ventured as far as south as the Gulf of California and then north through California. 
Concurrent with Ogden's expeditions, Alexander Roderick McLeod led trappers on the 
Oregon coast in 1826 and 1826-27, as far south as the Rogue River, in which he explored 
and trapped the Umpqua and Coquille rivers and the coastal mountain range. His efforts 
largely failed because of a combination of bad leadership skills and hostile native 
communities. In the more crucial lands further inland, however, the fur desert policy 
succeeded. After Work's 1833-34 Expedition only small, sporadic groups trapped Snake 
Country. 
The daily routine consisted of bringing in the previous night's catch, packing up 
the camp, and gathering the horses, and moving on to fresh beaver grounds. If the beaver 
numbers warranted more trapping, the party would stay in one place until they had taken 
what they could. They had to travel quickly to cover the maximum possible area and still 
return to Fort Nez Perces or Fort Vancouver by July, in time for the boat for Britain. 
The make-up and size of the Expeditions varied considerably in the 1820s. The 
first couple of Expeditions had about 60 engage and freeman trappers. After 1826, the 
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remaining outfits had about 30 to 40 trappers. Women and children, the trappers' families 
accompanied the brigades. In 1824-25, 30 women and 35 children participated. The 
Company's governing Committee and Governor Simpson both discouraged their 
presence because of the expectation women would only slow the brigades and drain their 
resources. 
The general tone of Ogden's journals is anxious and pressured. Prior to about 
1828, the possibility of Americans overrunning Snake Country remained very real. 
Perhaps he wanted to cover himself in case the fur desert policy failed, but the journals 
describe endless causes of difficulty and rare instances of good fortune. His positive 
comments concern streams they had cleared, such as his remarks at the Big Lost River in 
early October 1825: "A small stream not many years since well stocked in Beaver but 
Now entirely ruined there were a few remaining but the Snake Expedition of last year 
have (sic) secured them all."'" His negative, or worried comments, run the gamut from 
lost Expedition members to bugs: "As for insects we have no Cause to Complain, Fleas 
Wood Lice, Spiders & Crickets by millions."" 
The trips may have brought great profits to the Company, but they instilled little 
joy in the lives of the trappers, their families, and the Chief Trader at the head of the 
group. Heading out from the posts, they knew the problems they would face. The 
Americans, the least dangerous to life and limb, posed an economic threat. The 
Americans couid lure freemen and their pelts away from the expeditions and they too 
could trap anywhere they wished under the rules of the Convention of 1818. Often in the 
months in the field Ogden would have to send trappers out to beat the wandering 
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Americans to streams. If not the Americans, the weather could slow their progress. Going 
over Lost Trail Pass in January 1825, Ogden bemoaned the slow pace the weather had 
reduced them to because otherwise, "2 or 300 Beaver could be collected in this quarter."'^ 
(What weather he was expecting in January at 7000 feet, one can only wonder.) The 
Blackfeet Indians caused the most fear and apprehension. At one point near the Clark 
Fork River in western Montana, the freemen resisted going any further because they 
feared being attacked by Piegan bands in the area. The actual loss of life was not as high 
as the number of horses lost to raids by any of a number of parties, including the 
Blackfeet, in the vicinity of the trappers' camps.'^ 
John Work's journals of the 1830-31 and 1831-32 Expeditions give an indication 
of how successful Ogden's brigades had been. The weather, Blackfeet raids, and freemen 
still presented problems, but the American threat and the territory had both become more 
manageable. Work's outfits to Snake Country moved at a considerable pace and covered 
immense territories, but did not bring in substantial numbers of furs. During the stretch of 
the 1830-31 Expedition from 28 October 1830 to 4 April 1831, Work did not record a 
single beaver trapped. Unlike Ogden who worried if only ten beaver met their fate during 
the night. Work did not mention a hint of concern.''' 
John Work's life also differed considerably from Peter Skene Ogden's. Bom in 
about 1792 in County Donegal, Ireland, Work did not join the fur trade until 1814, at age 
22. What occupied him prior to 1814 remains a mystery. From his well-written journals it 
appears he had a good education. The circumstances that led him to join the HBC remain 
unknown also, but he entered the trade as a steward and worked his way up to clerk while 
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at York Factory. Simpson added Work to Ogden's contingent that went west in 1823 to 
the Columbia District. Once there, he moved around considerably, from Fort George to 
Spokane House to Fort Colvile to Fort Vancouver during the 1820s. At some point he 
met his métis wife, Josette (Susette?) Legace who lived near Fort Colvile or Spokane 
House. In 1830, Simpson replaced Ogden with Work in Snake Country.'^ 
By the 1830s Snake Country had developed quite a reputation for the difficulties 
it posed to the brigades. In an 1833 letter to a friend, Archibald McKenzie wrote, "Poor 
Work still continues wandering among the serpents [probably the Snake (Shoshone) 
Indians] and independent of the venom, I believe he has no enviable task of it; it is likely 
this season he will succeed me here [Fort Langely]."'® Personal hardship abounded in the 
daily life on the brigades. During Work's 1831-32 outfit, a man was shot on 30 January 
during a skirmish with the Blackfeet at Birch Creek (in present-day Montana). He died 
about six weeks later on the Salmon River after suffering immensely. Work described his 
death: "William Raymond, our unfortunate man who was wounded on 30 January, died 
this afternoon. He was reduced to a mere skeleton; he had taken scarcely any nourishment 
since he was wounded. The wound was mortified."'^ Even so, the profits brought in and 
the buffer zone created by the Snake Country Expeditions ensured the continuation of the 
Expeditions until the 1840s, when the question became a moot point due to the settlement 
of tlie Oregon Question with the Americans. 
To read the British journals from the Snake Country Expeditions is to read a story 
of creating scarcity. From the start there is a sense that trapping exceeded local 
population resilience quickly. As time passed, the ransacking done by the trappers 
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produced a widespread effect. The effects of both prior and contemporary Hudson's Bay 
Company, American, and Indian trapping and beaver biology aided the Snake Country 
Expeditions in their efforts. In the end, the British created the fur desert. Not every beaver 
was taken but they left insufficient numbers for a successful or even marginally 
worthwhile trapping expedition. During the critical years of the Snake Expeditions, 1823-
1841, Hudson's Bay took approximately 35,000 beaver out of the region. In 1823-24 
alone, the yield was 4500 beaver. By 1834, the average annual yield was down to 665 
beaver. Even when the population rebounded slightly, in the late 1830s, the numbers 
trapped remained low, never again reaching 4000. The evidence of this decline appears 
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Figure 2.4 Beaver Pelt Returns, 1824-1832" 
It was Alexander Ross who led his 1823-1824 party through Snake Country and 
trapped the original high of4500 beaver. By the next expedition, the trappers noticed the 
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effects. In September 1824, on the Bitterroot River, Ogden noted in his journal that, "this 
part of the Country tho' once abounding in Beaver is entirely ruined. This same 
sentiment was repeated for other streams and rivers all through the 1820s. At the junction 
of Emigrant Creek and Sylvies River in northeastern Oregon, Ogden recorded, "We have 
only one Beaver altho upwards of fifty Traps - our Trappers certainly appear to have 
clean'd the river well."^' In 1831 Chief Factor McLoughlin wrote to George Simpson 
questioning the viability of another trapping party because the region was too exhausted 
to enable a party of sufficient defensive strength to trap enough beaver to make it 
worthwhile.^^ 
If there remained any doubt that the trappers intended to clear the rivers and 
streams of beaver, the journals clarify their exact goal for the area. In 1826, at the 
Owhyhee River, Ogden added this comment to the end of his daily entry: "This day 11 
Beaver 1 Otter we have now ruined this quarter we may prepare to start. A couple of 
weeks later Ogden left the Burnt River because it had, "been examined and now 
ascertained to be destitute of beaver. By 1841 the full effects of the fur desert began to 
appear in the Columbia District. Still the British remained unwilling to take any 
rehabilitative measures because, according to Simpson, "In the present unsettled state of 
the boundary line it would be impolitic to make any attempt to preserve or recruit this 
once valuable country, as it would attract the attention of the American trappers, so that 
there is little prospect of any amendment taking place in its affairs."^' 
The extent to which the Expeditions trapped every possible beaver in Snake 
Country reveals itself in the ratio of small to large beaver returned by the Expeditions. 
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During the nearly twenty years of the Expeditions prior to 1841, the year when the vogue 
of the silk hat first decreased demand for beaver pelts, the HBC trappers took any and all 
beaver they could. No incentive encouraged them to be selective and look for likely 
places to trap large beaver. Elsewhere, finding large beaver meant a better investment in 
time because of the higher prices they brought. The goal and organization of the Snake 
Country Expeditions, however, encouraged trappers to take any beaver they could find. 
As a result, small and large beaver ratios roughly reflect the make-up of the population. 
Not surprisingly, over time the beaver populations in Snake Country became younger 
(smaller) and more scarce. 
The effects of overtrapping show up in the ratios of small to large beaver pelts as 
early as 1825. That year the return of 3695 pelts had 1210 small and 2485 large pelts, or a 
ratio of 0.49. Up to 1834, the ratio stayed fairly low, around 0.2 to 0.4 In 1837, the ratio 
jumped to 0.75 and did not drop below 0.5 until 1843. After that, the population 
fluctuated highly from year to year, although the exact reason would be hard to determine 
because of the increased number of factors influencing the trade such as the presence of 
American settlers, a decrease in the dememd for pelts, and a natural variability. Six of the 
years between 1825 and 1845 exceeded or 0.6 ratio. This contrast sharply with New 
Caladonia, where returns never exceeded 0.6 during those years.^^ 
The history of the fur trade is often told in terms of European and Euro-American 
men conquering the wilderness but the Snake Country Expeditions that created the fur 
desert had far more diverse populations. The trappers and laborers included metis, 
French-Canadians, Iroquois from the Great Lakes, Abenaki from eastern Canada, 
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members of other tribes from central Canada and the Northern Rockies, Hawaiians, and 
Orkney Islanders from northern Scotland, in addition to the British members of the 
Expeditions. The Company assembled this varied group to go into Snake Country 
because they could not induce native people, the Northern Shoshone in particular, to trap 
in the region. No cultural reasons prevented the native inhabitants from participating in 
the fur trade. It appears that more practical reasons precluded their use as trappers in 
Snake Country. Among the possible reasons for the native reluctance to trapping was 
their access to European trade goods through Taos and regional trade centers such as The 
Dalles. They also grew their own tobacco, one of the staples of the fur trade. Big game 
thrived in the area, so there was no need to pursue beaver for food. And the Snake 
Country, particularly the upper Snake, was too remote from the posts to draw Shoshone 
in to trade or to send Indians out from the vicinity of the posts. As a result, in contrast to 
most other Company operations, in Snake Country the British trapped the beaver 
themselves, relying on Company servants and freemen (independent trappers living in the 
region) to make Snake Country economically unattractive to the Americans. 
The Hudson's Bay Company may not have been so successfijl as they were in 
creating a fur desert except that certain characteristics of the brigades made them 
particularly well suited for the task. Both structural characteristics and the individuals 
involved strongly influenced their efficiency and effectiveness. In many ways the Snake 
Country Expeditions, despite their unique purpose, represent the norm for the Hudson's 
Bay Company, particularly in the relations between the different socioeconomic and 
ethnic groups and between genders. While the factors separating members of the 
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Expeditions were different, the nature of these small, nomadic communities was clearly 
as stratified as British society at home in London. Instead of nobility, gentry, and 
commoners, the Snake Country Expeditions had officers, engages and freemen. As in 
British society, women were present and active but hidden as far as official business was 
concerned. 
The officers of the Expeditions held offices such as Chief Factor, Chief Trader or 
clerk. The Chief Factor of the Columbia District, Dr. John McLoughlin, stayed at Fort 
Vancouver and managed the whole District. The Chief Traders led the trapping 
expeditions. Alexander Ross, Peter Skene Ogden, and John Work all held this position. 
Not only positions of status, officers also received a salary plus a share of the company's 
profits. These men were nearly universally British or British-Canadian and educated. 
McLoughlin was a medical doctor and Ogden had started preparation to become a lawyer 
before entering the fur trade. Although Ogden's and Work's journals are not literary 
works of art, they do show intelligence and thought. Ensuring that the Expeditions ran 
smoothly and obtained the maximum number of fiirs was the officers' principle task. 
Their ethnicity, education and general ability provided the background the Company felt 
they needed to lead the Expeditions effectively.^^ 
Below the officers, there were two categories of trappers: engagés and freemen. 
Engagés generally came from French-Canadian or another European background, such as 
the Orkneymen from the Orkney Islands in northern Scotland. Trapping as many pelts as 
possible was their primary task, except the few men hired as laborers. The Company paid 
the engagés a salary for both their expedition work, such as filling in as the steersman. 
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and for any pelts they trapped. Unlike the officers, engagés would not be promoted up the 
ranks. A clerk might become a Chief Trader, but an engagé would not, except in rare 
cases, become a clerk.^' Engagés may have been salaried employees of the Company, 
something of an honor, but they were not held in high esteem. Nathaniel Wyeth, an 
American in the region in the 1830$, clearly understood the position the primarily 
Canadian engagés held when he wrote. 
The Hudson's Bay Company have (sic) a post on the Umbiquoi [Umpqua] river, 
to which they occasionally send goods, but it can be of little importance, as its 
business in intrusted (sic) to a common Canadian, which is never done by the 
Hudson's Bay Company in any case where an important interest is at stake.^° 
While their potential was limited, life as an engagé was not any worse than eking out a 
living in the Orkney Islands or working in eastern Canada.^' 
The freemen occupied the next lowest position in the Snake Country social order. 
This was the most culturally diverse group. Predominately, the men were métis (the 
descendants of Indian and French unions), Iroquois fi-om the Great Lakes and French-
Canadians. In far fewer numbers, there were also Abenaki Indians from eastern Canada, 
members of other central Canadian and Northern Rockies tribes, and Hawaiians. 
Canadians, métis, and Iroquois freemen all trapped. Other than the Iroquois, Native 
Américains joined the Expeditions as laborers. Unlike officers and engagés, the freemen 
were not paid salaries; they bought their supplies on credit and repaid the Company with 
pelts. The fireemen would be paid for any pelts that surpassed the number owed the 
Company (usually a theoretical possibility only). This policy directly supported the fiir 
desert policy's objectives, although there is no evidence that this was intentional. A 
freeman, the perfect agent of the fur desert policy, had every incentive to trap as many 
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furs as humanly possible because the more he brought back to the fort, the more potential 
he had to clear a profit/^ 
The freemen were in the Columbia District for a number of reasons. These men 
had married Indian women and chose to stay with them. Some had been taken of the rolls 
as part of the general streamlining efforts undertaken by Simpson. A large part of the 
freemen consisted of those who had been dismissed because of unruly or undependable 
behavior. The Company was not willing to pay these men a salary, but would hire them 
as freemen. Sylvia Van Kirk, in her history of gender relations in the fur trade. Many 
Tender Ties, argues the primary reason that former North West Company engagés 
remained in the region and worked as fi"eemen for the Hudson's Bay Company was 
"loyalty to their Indian families."^^ Iroquois, and others from tribes east of the Rockies, 
represented the westernmost extent of a population shift caused by the decline of beaver 
across Canada. These tribes had been involved in the fiir trade since the seventeenth 
century. When faced with a decline in beaver numbers, they moved west to new trapping 
grounds. By the 1820s, they had made their way to the Columbia District.^'' 
The Hudson's Bay Company needed the freemen to maintain their profits but 
those who worked with them did not appreciate their role, but instead viewed them as a 
necessary evil. Simpson's journal provides a vivid example of the officers' views of the 
freemen. He wrote. 
When such a worthless and motley crew are collected together lying idle for Four 
Months on end they are forming plots and quarreling with the Natives and 
exposing themselves and us to much trouble and danger. This band of Freemen 
the very scum of the country and generally outcasts from the service for 
misconduct are the most unruly and troublesome gang to deal with in this or 
perhaps any other part of the world.^^ 
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While Simpson viewed them as a threat to company interests, Ogden worried they would 
be a danger to themselves. In 1827, while traveling through hostile Indian country, Ogden 
asked that the Freemen in the rear of the party keep up but, he wrote, "This warning I 
constantly repeat to them every time we meet but I believe of no avail careless as they 
always have been and so will they remain jusque a la mort."^^ One has to wonder how 
accurate this portrayal of the freemen is, considering the class and ethnicity 
consciousness of the writers. Even if it is accurate, the question still remains whether their 
unruliness was an inherent character flaw or because they had little to lose by not 
complying with the officers' expectations and even less to gain. Interestingly, the officers 
never complained about the freemen's trapping ability or returns. 
Perhaps more important than any amount of unruliness or carelessness in 
influencing the officers' view of the freemen was their propensity to desert the 
Expeditions in the early years. The Hudson's Bay Company's practice of selling goods to 
freemen on credit included a catch: the prices charged the trappers were obscenely high. 
Their monopoly in the region enabled them to maintain a large labor pool at a minimum 
price because there was no competition with whom the freemen could trade. Thus, when 
the Americans entered the region they easily induced freemen to join their camps and 
bring all their frirs with them.^^ In May 1825 Ogden failed to prevent twelve trappers 
from deserting to an American trapping party led by John Gardner. In response to 
Ogden's arguments, a trapper named Montour said, "Go we will where we shall be paid 
for our furs and not be imposed and not cheated as we are in the Columbia. In order to 
gain access to the American prices, a few days after Montour and the other eleven 
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freemen deserted to the Americans, three more men left, leaving their wives, children, 
horses and fiars. In 1826 John McLoughlin addressed this issue by adjusting the prices 
charged and paid the freemen and sending a higher percentage of engagés on the 
Expedition.^' 
These three classes of fur traders, the officers, the engages, and the freeman 
comprise the official components of the Snake Country Expeditions, and the British fiir 
trade in North America generally. What has been left out of the official journals, 
documents, and most histories is the active role native and métis women played. 
The full details of the women's presence were not included in the Expeditions' 
journals and documents but some information can be gleaned from the texts and some can 
be drawn from other histories of the fur trade. While nearly all of the men were married at 
some point to Indian women, it is not entirely clear if all wives accompanied the 
Expeditions. Peter Skene Ogden was married to Julia Rivet, a Nez Perce woman, but she 
is never mentioned in his journals. Work's wife, a métis woman named Josette 
accompanied his Expedition in the early 1830s though his journals do not make that clear. 
The engagés and freemen also brought their wives but it is not clear if all the men that 
were married brought their wives. For example, Ross' 1823-24 Expedition listed 55 men 
and 25 women (and, interestingly, 64 children). The issue is ftirther muddled by the 
instances when the documents indicate that no women were allowed with the group when 
there is evidence they were indeed present. Ogden denied the presence of women in 1825 
but when he wrote about the women digging camas roots on the Snake River Plain, he 
wondered why the natives did not collect the root. If the local Indian women were not 
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collecting the roots, the only other possibility is that women connected with his group 
were doing so/" 
Because fur trade society lacked the separation of spheres that European society 
maintained, women married to fur trappers maintained an "integral socio-economic role." 
This role included a broad range of possible activities. Throughout the fur trade women 
were responsible for making moccasins, snowshoes, and pemmican, for pitching tents, 
drying meat, collecting berries and helping carry supplies and pelts. In the Columbia 
District, women caught and dried salmon and collected wappittoo root in addition to the 
other tasks already mentioned.'" 
Of the tasks women performed for the Expeditions, Ogden only recognized 
dressing furs in his journals. This was probably due in large part to the nature of 
European society in which the governing committee existed and from which the officers 
came. During the early nineteenth century men's and women's lives in the middle and 
upper classes of British society began to separate into public and private spheres. Officers 
either took for granted women's activities that did not contribute directly to finances, or 
they could have been tailoring the facts from their expeditions to what the Committee 
would want to know, which would not include what the women were doing. 
Perhaps the most economically important task women handled was dressing furs. 
Ogden acknowledge the women's role and their skill when he wrote, "It is a pleasure to 
observe the Ladys (sic) of the Camp vieing (sic) with each other who will produce on 
their return to Fort Vancouver the cleanest and best dress'd Beaver."'*^ Milan Novak, a 
fur-bearer manager for the Ontario Bureau of Natural Resources, wrote that, in his 
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experience, the fastest someone could skin, clean, and stretch a beaver pelt for drying was 
one-half hour. For the women on the Snake Country Expeditions, that meant if the traps 
brought in 52 beaver, as they did on 12 May 1825 on the Little Bear River, it would take 
approximately twenty-six hours of labor to process the pelts.^^ 
The lack of information about women limits our understanding of the role they 
played in the fur desert policy. Women most likely influenced the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Expeditions. Considering the variety of time-consuming tasks they 
fulfilled, an absence of women would have slowed the Expeditions' pace and limited the 
overall distance they covered. Ogden's Expeditions would not have reached what is today 
Ogden, Utah had their pace been slowed by the triple burden of trapping, dressing pelts, 
and performing daily tasks that would have been placed on the trappers. An enormous 
amount of land would have been left to a later year. In the meantime, the slower pace and 
reduced efficiency would have given trapped areas more time to recover. The impact of 
the fur desert policy would be a distinctly different story had the officers, engages, and 
freemen been obliged to rely entirely on their own energy. 
The Snake Country Expeditions also capitalized on the biology of beaver in their 
"success" with the fur desert policy. The lodges that beaver lived in and the dams they 
built made them easy to find in the forest. Trappers did not have to search for beaver; if 
they were there, they left plenty of evidence. Also, once the trapper placed a trap baited 
with castoreum, a substance secreted by glands on the beaver with a scent that is unique 
to each individual, the beaver would have to overcome its instincts to resist the attraction. 
Beaver are extremely territorial and scents left by other beaver alarm them. Only the most 
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shy, or wild, animals resisted this urge, which led to the situation south of present-day 
Ola, Idaho when Ogden remarked in 1827, "The trappers complain the few beaver there 
are very wild."'*'' By selecting out the bold beaver, the trappers left "wild" or shy beaver 
that made up the remnant population. The "wild" beaver largely saved the population 
from complete extirpation. The nature of beaver mating and reproduction also gave the 
Company a hand in clearing Snake Country of beaver. By taking all the beaver they could 
entice into their traps during the winter and spring, the trappers created an entirely 
different situation than the one in which the beaver evolved. Beaver life history reflected 
the relatively few numbers they lost to predators prior to the trappers. Kits in their first 
winter and beaver older than ten to eleven years had the highest mortality rates, mostly 
due to stresses caused by environmental conditions. Birds and mammals, such as eagles 
and wolves, preyed on kits and two-year-olds, as they dispersed to new colonies, but the 
prédation rate was generally low.'*^ 
This low rate of prédation did not result from a lack of interest on the predators' 
behalf. As the trappers could attest, beaver meat was both tasty and nutritious. The beaver 
protected themselves from exposure to those that wanted to eat them through a number of 
strategies. Ponds protected them from predators that could not swim underwater. The 
occasional otter that swam to the lodge entrance could be dispatched with the beaver's 
magnificent teeth. When their ponds froze over, the mating pair could copulate and give 
birth in nearly complete safety. Furthermore, kits could be protected in the lodge until 
they learned to dive and swim to protect themselves. The security of the lodge and pond 
allowed the beaver to maintain monogamous mating relationships and to produce 
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relatively few offspring. The beaver pair, unlike other rodents known for their prodigious 
reproduction rates and low rate of survival to maturity, invested their energy in raising 
their lo w number of offspring to subadulthood. 
In the spring and early summer, the male brought the bulk of the female and kits' 
food to them in the lodge. Leaving the pond to gather food exposed the beaver to a higher 
risk of prédation. Also in the spring, two to three year olds began the process of 
dispersing to establish their own colonies. If death befell the male during his food or dam 
material runs, he could be replaced by one of the dispersing subadults. Because the 
females established and maintained the lodges, the new male could simply be 
incorporated into the colony as a new mate. If the female died, however, the rest of the 
colony generally abandoned the site. In either case, the time of highest danger from 
prédation, spring and summer, was also the time of easiest replacement or resettlement."® 
The HBC trappers descended upon the streams and rivers in Snake Country in the 
late winter and early spring to catch the beaver with their pelts in prime winter condition. 
They upset this seasonal pattern of high and low risk periods. No longer did the ponds 
protect the beaver, they only made their locations more obvious. The trappers took the 
adults and the dispersing subadults that might have replaced them. 
Trapping in the late winters and early springs the Company did the most damage 
possible to the populations due to the loss of litters. Beaver only produce one litter per 
year of two-four kits, on average. Taking the beaver from February to May invariably 
meant taking pregnant females. Ogden noted the devastating effect their timing had on 
the populations in May 1829 at Bull Run Creek near Bull Run and Tuscarora Mountains: 
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It is scarcely credible what a destruction of beaver by trapping this season, within 
the last few days upwards of fifty females have been taken and on an average each 
with four young ready to litter. Did not we hold this country by so slight a tenure 
it would be most to our interest to trap only in the fall, and by this mode it would 
take many years to ruin it/^ 
While Ogden grasped the short-term consequences, he did not ever remark upon 
the long-term consequences of taking every possible beaver out of each colony. First, 
female beaver do not produce a constant litter size over their lifetimes. They reach the 
peak of their fertility around six to seven years and have smaller and fewer litters both 
before and after. Trapping mature females indiscriminately skewed the age structure to a 
higher number of young females. Not only did these females produce smaller litters, but 
they were also more likely to die before reaching their peak years because the energy the 
young females put into reproduction at age three, when they are first sexually mature, 
should have gone into their own growth until age four, when females begin to breed in an 
unexploited colony. Thus, soon in the fur desert policy's implementation, young females 
were carrying the brunt of breeding and were less likely to survive harsh weather, poor 
food quality, or other environmental stresses. Further, when females were trapped 
between May and July, after giving birth, the kits were still nursing. If it was late enough 
in the spring, they may have switched to a regular beaver diet. But, if the mother was lost 
before the kits were one to two months old, the change may have been too abrupt and the 
litter, or part of it, was probably lost."* 
Beaver are bom open-eyed, ready to swim, and with an instinct to stop water 
rushing through their dam. Yet they stay in the parental colony as non-mating subadults 
for two to three years (depending largely on the availability of open territory for 
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dispersal). While there is no consensus among biologists, it appears that these two years 
give the subadults time to learn. This learning includes experimenting with ways to build 
and repair dams or felling and dragging trees back to the pond. This experience may not 
be necessary for survival, but it might make survival more likely. By denying the 
subadults this time with the adults, before they needed to establish and maintain their own 
territories, the trappers probably affected the future survival rates of those few beaver 
they left in the lodges."' 
Other factors also may have contributed to the expeditions "success" with the fur 
desert policy. Climate, particularly the relative wetness of the 1820s and 1830s, would 
have affected the beaver population levels and their rebound from overtrapping. Beaver 
need water for their protection, for the vegetation it supports, and as living space under 
the ice during the winter. Dendroclimatological reconstructions indicate that 
temperatures in the 1820s were generally lower than twentieth century averages and that 
most of the Snake River region received lower rainfall rates. Only the southwestern 
comer and midsection of Idaho (around Lewiston) and northeastern Oregon had high 
rainfall rates. Significantly, the Snake River basin and eastern Oregon, already very dry 
regions, received lower than average rainfall. Pollen counts in eastern Oregon, at 
Diamond Craters, reveal a decrease in juniper and grasses and an increase in sagebrush. 
This and the dendroclimatological evidence indicate the region experienced higher 
temperatures and less rainfall in the last 100 years. This is consistent with the North 
American trends at the end of the Little Ice Age around 1850. The effect of these changes 
on beaver went unrecorded. It can be speculated, however, that lower precipitation would 
68 
mean less water for vegetation and ponding behind dams. As temperatures warmed, and 
precipitation decreased, more stress may have been placed on beaver, thus influencing 
their ability to rebound from the Snake River brigades and prolonging their absence from 
the streams and rivers/" 
Lower water levels, even on the short term, made beaver more susceptible to 
epizootics and predators. Disease or fire might have further reduced beaver numbers in 
Snake Country. Epizootics, such as tularemia, can kill entire colonies. Tularemia is a 
native disease that is always present in beaver ponds. Low water causes higher 
concentrations of the disease to build up and increases chances of beaver contracting it. 
Fires, too can kill beaver, bum their food supply and building materials, and leave them 
unable to survive the winter. The journals do not give any indication of droughts, which 
would encourage both epizootics and fire due to lack of water.^' However, while trapping 
in eastern Oregon Ogden came upon a scene that indicates something caused problems 
for beaver populations. According to John McLoughlin, on the Crooked River near 
Beaver Creek Ogden, "travelled several days among remains of dams and lodges now 
mostly destroyed by fire, but whether fire destroyed the Beaver or disease he cannot 
say."'^ It is possible epizootics had weakened populations prior to the Snake Country 
Expeditions, but there is no indication that whatever Ogden found caused major threats to 
beaver on a regional level during the 1820s and 1830s. 
Americans also aided the British in creating the fur desert. In the eastern reaches 
of Snake Country, particularly in what is now Idaho, the Americans actively pursued 
every last beaver, as the British did. They acted not according to a policy such as the fur 
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desert but in self interest. Ogden continually saw the effects of their parties. When he sent 
some of his trappers to the source of the Blackfeet River in Idaho in 1825 hoping to find 
abundant beaver he remeirked upon their lack of success that, "it appears that quarter have 
been trapped by the Americans last year."^^ Apparently irritated, Ogden made the 
following puzzling statement: "but few traps in the Water the Americans have taken 
nearly all the Beaver they are a Selfish Set they leave nothing for their Friends we act 
differently."^'* There is no obvious explanation for his remarks, unless Ogden suffered 
from a remarkable blindness to his own motives and intentions, but it does show how 
effective the Americans were in their trapping efforts. Six years later, on the 1831-32 
Expedition, John Work assumed Americans had trapped out the upper reaches of a creek 
he passed.^' 
Across Snake Country, from the Big Lost River in present-day Idaho to the Little 
Applegate River in what is now southwestern Oregon, native people also exerted pressure 
on the beaver populations. It is not clear from the journals or from tribal cultural 
traditions, if these tribes trapped beaver for their own use or for trade, but it is clear they 
took a significant number from the streams. Ogden blamed the Piegan Indians for ruining 
a small stream neai' what is now Camas Creek in Idaho.Later, on the Crooked River, 
Ogden estimated, "If this River had not been visited by the Fort Nez Percee (sic) Indians 
it would have yielded from 4 to 500 beaver."" When the 1826-1827 Snake Expedition to 
the Klamath Lake region arrived, the local people had already trapped out the Little 
Applegate River. 
Finally, the Expeditions succeeded at creating a fur desert in part because some 
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areas did not support beaver colonies, as Ogden found out on the southern side of the 
Snake River in 1826. By trapping out the areas between these "bare" spots, the buffer 
zone slowly grew to encompass the entire region that now includes southern Idaho, 
southwestern Washington, eastern Oregon, and parts of western Montana. 
Did the Expeditions fulfill their purpose? In the short term, they prevented 
extensive American entrance into the region. While in the early 1830s there were 500 to 
600 American trappers in Snake Country, by 1836 those numbers had declined to one 
party, led by Nathaniel Wyeth.^' This success came at a price to the HBC. Wyeth wrote a 
memorial to Congress in 1836 which provides an estimate what that price might have 
been to the Company. He stated that the fur trade in the Columbia District brought in 
$138,000 but cost about $20,000 in supplies, the services of 350 men, shipping costs, and 
a loss of two years interest on the investment because of the turnaround time between 
London and the Columbia District. As a result, Wyeth argued, "notwithstanding the great 
disparity of the money value of the articles exchanged in this trade, that it has been less 
profitable than any other in which as much danger of life and property is incurred. The 
British may have succeeded in clearing the country and excluding the Americans, but not 
without some disadvantages to themselves. 
Surprisingly, the Americans, for all their discussion of the Oregon Question, 
never seemed to fully grasp what the HBC intended to do with the region. Trappers in the 
Northern Rockies certainly realized the Company had taken nearly all the beaver. 
Nathaniel Wyeth, trying to establish fur trade operations in 1832, wrote in his journal. 
We moved in a W. by S. direction about 15 miles to a creek putting into Lewis 
[Snake] River on which we found no beaver of consequence having been 
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trap[p]ed out by the Hudson's Bay Company some years before/' 
William Ashley wrote to Thomas Hart Benton, an important Congressional supporter of 
the American claim to Oregon, in 1827 about the rivers and streams of what is now 
southern Idaho and western Montana. He complained, "That the same water courses did, 
when first trapped, furnish double the quantity of furs in the same time, with the same 
labor, I have not the least doubt. It did not require much skill to determine that beaver 
did not live in the waterways of Snake Country in any numbers by the late 1820s, but the 
Americans did not connect the lack of beaver with any concerted policy to exclude them 
from anything more than the profits. 
Americans' concerns voiced to Congress addressed a number of issues. Foremost 
among these, the Hudson's Bay Company's advantage as a monopoly contradicted the 
American system of allowing any company to try their luck in the fur trade. Joshua 
Pilcher wrote to J.H. Eaton in 1833 that the HBC was "rich in wealth, strong in power, 
and efficient in its organization. It is second only to the East India Company, and, like it, 
has immense territories and irmumerable tribes of natives, besides its own proper 
strength, under its command."®^ The HBC did enjoy a considerable advantage as a result 
of their monopoly. They could undersell and outbid any smaller company that tried to 
compete with them. Thomas Hart Benton claimed in his memoirs to have recognized this 
danger when he first read the Convention of 1818. He wrote in 1883, "I no sooner saw it 
[the Convention of 1818] than I saw its delusive nature - its one-sidedness - and the 
whole disastrous consequences which were to result from it to the United States."^'* He 
quoted from his own article written after he read the Convention: 
The fur trade is the object. It will fare with our traders on the Columbia as it fared 
with on the Miami of the Lakes (and on the lakes themselves), under the British 
treaties of '94 and '96, which admitted British traders into our territories. Our 
traders will be driven out; and that by the fair competition of trade, even if there 
should be no foul play. The difference between free and dutied goods, would 
work that result. The British traders pay no duties: ours pay above an average of 
fifty per centum.^^ 
Americans do not seem to have realized the Company's fear of opposition, no matter how 
small. The mere possibility of competition in Snake Country motivated the fur desert 
policy more than any other factor. 
Americans also declared the danger of Company influence of Indians in the 
Northwest had and would cause innumerable dangers and problems for settlers and 
businesses in the Oregon Country. Considering the problems caused by European 
influence over tribes in the East following the Revolutionary War, their concern may 
have been justified. Joshua Pilcher, a fur trader, wrote to Eaton to warn him of the 
influence the HBC had with Native Americans in Snake Country. However, they carried 
their rhetoric to extremes.®® Thomas Hart Benton argued for one reason the British should 
be expelled from Oregon: 
The losses already sustained by our citizens from the ravages of Indians, incited 
against them by the British Hudson's Bay company, were stated by Mr. Linn upon 
good authority, to be five hundred men in lives taken in the first ten years of the 
joint occupation treaty, and a half a million of dollars in property robbed or 
destroyed, besides getting exclusive possession of our soil, and the command of 
our own Indians within our own limits.®^ 
The fact that no evidence supported these claims of losses did not stop Benton or John C. 
Calhoun from using them to vilify the Company. In 1843, Calhoun bemoaned the 
dominance of the Company in the Northwest and exclaimed. 
Nay, indeed, no traders! For they have disappeared before foreign competition; or 
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fallen a sacrifice to the rifle, tomahawk, or the scalping knife or those savages 
whom the Hudson Bay Company can always make the instruments of systematic 
massacre of adventurous rivals/^ 
Finally, the agricultural potential of Oregon Country attracted the attention of all 
Americans. Nathaniel Wyeth, fur trader, and the Protestant missionaries, among others, 
knew the territory well enough to encourage others to go west to farm the land. More than 
the fur trade, land not yet settled by white Americans or Europeans drew American 
attention to the Oregon Question. In 1837, Peter Skene Ogden wrote to John McLeod 
about the Columbia District. He conveyed the cost of the trade and some irritation at the 
latest American arrivals. He wrote, 
There are also five more Gent as follows: 2 in quest of Flowers 2 killing all the 
Birds in the Columbia & 1 in quest of rocks and stones all these bucks came with 
letters from the President of the U. States and you know it would not be good 
policy not to treat them politely they are a perfect nuisance.^' 
Emigration to Oregon Country began in 1841 and Americans totaled about 5500 by 1845. 
The Hudson's Bay Company continued to trap in the region but not with the same policy 
and with far less success. As long as the dispute turned only on the fiir trade, the 
Company had nothing to fear. However, once American settlement started, the advantage 
shifted to the American side.'" 
The importance ofagriculture to the Americans may explain the lack of attention 
paid to what the HBC tried to do in Snake Country. In the 1826 document that extended 
the Convention of 1818 indefinitely, until one country or the other gave one year's notice 
of wanting to settle the boundary issue, not one mention of HBC practices occurs.^' Even 
when letters pointing out how thoroughly the British dominated the trade arrived in 
Washington, DC little debate ensued. In 1827, William H. Ashley wrote to Thomas Hart 
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Benton to share an entirely exaggerated boast with the Senator: 
Mr. Ogden, who had charge of that party [Snake Country Eexpedition] informed 
Mr. [Jedediah] Smith [at Flathead Post in 1824-1825], rather exultingly, that his 
party, composed of about sixty men, had taken, during their operations in the 
district claimed by the Snake Indians, (a small portion of our territory West of the 
Rocky Mountains) eighty five thousand beaver/^ 
A couple of years later, Ashley, David E. Jackson, and William Sublette wrote to J.H. 
Eaton to convey that. 
They [HBC] do not trap north of latitude 49 degrees, but confine that business to 
the territory of the United States. Thus this territory, being trapped by both 
parties, is nearly exhausted of beaver, and unless the British can be stopped, will 
soon be entirely exhausted." 
Still, no substantial response came from the United States. 
With their focus on diplomatic disputes and agriculture, the Americans in the 
eastern United States hardly noticed what the British fur traders intended to do in Snake 
Country. But the fur desert policy would profoundly influence the land they wanted so 
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Chapter Three 
"A few good winters [without the beaver], and the streams went to he il." 
-Lew Pence, U.S. Soil Conservation Service ' 
Change did not suddenly begin occurring in the Pacific Northwest in 1823, when 
the first Snake Country Expedition started out from Flathead Post. It did not start when 
the first Europeans scouted along the coast in the 1770's and introduced trade goods and 
disease to the people living in present-day British Columbia. Not even the first humans 
who settled the Columbia Basin about 10,000 years ago could claim they started the 
processes of change in the Northwest. The geology, climate, vegetation, and animals have 
all continually evolved over time that stretches back beyond imagination. The fur desert 
policy represents not the advent of change on the Columbia Plateau, but instead one layer 
in the transformation of humans' relationship with the land in the region. The native 
communities also altered and exploited the land, but the Europeans, backed by their 
technology and market ethic, caused large-scale changes in the land more rapidly and for 
different reasons than any other people before them. The long-term consequences of the 
fur desert policy contributed to the overall changes in the landscape and the local cultures 
that are visible today. 
Beaver repopulation in Snake Country has been uneven. Some argue that the 
current population is merely 10% of precontact numbers, while others, especially in areas 
where beaver have become "nuisances," would say they are back in full force. 
Unfortunately, no study, or even a written account of beaver in Snake Country exists for 
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the nineteenth century. What is certain, however, is that human activities have limited 
their rebound. Lew Pence, formerly of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service in Gooding, 
Idaho believes that the lack of 
beaver is a missing link in Idaho ecosystems and he blames humans for their absence. 
Pence cites the fur trapping done by the HBC and others in the early nineteenth century 
and later trapping. Beaver populations have been kept low since the fur trade era due to 
trapping in response to periodic increases in prices for pelts or individual beaver colonies 
causing problems for landowners or roads. As farmers drained wetlands and repressed the 
regrowth of trees along streambanks, habitat declined also. Their rebound must have been 
slowed somewhat in contrast to what it might have been without these human pressures. 
In other areas of Snake Country, beaver may have rebounded to a greater extent than in 
southern Idaho. Generally, where people have been excluded, or in more hospitable 
habitats, beaver populations have had better, but limited, success at returning to their old 
habitats.^ 
An educated guess as to how long it took for the beaver to increase substantially is 
several decades. On Isle Royale, a national park on Lake Superior, the beaver population 
increased from "very scarce" to about 1100 beaver in forty years, without any trapping 
pressure. That is a substantial amount of time for the plants and animals that rely on the 
beaver's activities for water, food and habitat. While the complete picture of 
environmental change following European contact involves a variety of activities and 
processes, a look at the beaver's role in ecosystems reveals the probable consequences of 
trapping them to near extirpation. The beaver's absence undoubtedly led to significant 
83 
changes in the region's riparian communities/ 
The beaver is a keystone species, one of those critical animals that determines 
community structure. Although they do not directly affect other animal species through 
prédation, they do affect which animal and plant species can live in an area through their 
impact on the physical and biological structures of riparian zones. Beaver have been 
shown to influence the "biogeochemical cycles, nutrient retention, geomorphology, 
biodiversity, community dynamics, and structural complexity" of their ecosystems.'' Their 
dambuilding and foraging had far-reaching consequences for Snake Country. 
The very streambanks the Hudson's Bay men stood upon as they set their traps 
would not be the same after the local beaver fell for the ever-effective castoreum bait. The 
most basic effect beaver can have on a stream is impoundment. Dams affect two separate 
processes that involve the soil on the sides of the stream and in the water. The first, 
reducing erosion, results from the alteration of the stream channel. Dams create ponds 
behind them and a series of dams, built by the same or several family groups, results in a 
more gradual stream slope. While the actual channel remains the same, the way the water 
moves over it changes. Instead of a headlong rush to the ocean, the ponds force the water 
to dawdle. This "stair-step profile" reduces velocity and, therefore, the water's ability to 
erode the sides and bottom of the stream channel.^ 
Beaver dam breaks can cause disturbances that bring temporarily higher erosion 
and can kill the small organisms on the stream bottom and fish eggs. However, the dam 
failures also open up the stream to fish migration. Channel scour by the rush of pond 
water creates bare areas, preparing them for plants requiring recently disturbed ground, 
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such as certain species of willows. However, these events are relatively isolated and 
infrequent. Beaver dams so effectively reduce erosion in streambanks that ranchers and 
wildlife managers have begun to use them to repair riparian areas damaged by grazing.® 
The second soil process affected by beaver dams, sedimentation, also relates to 
how dams reduce stream velocity. Lower velocity reduces the stream's sediment carrying 
power. As the waterflow slows in the pond, the sediments drop to the pond bottom and 
accumulate over time. When the beaver move on to establish a new colony, usually due 
to the exhaustion of local food resources, the pond eventually drains when the untended 
dam weakens and leaks or breaks. The exposed sediment is then available to terrestrial 
plant life. One group of researchers studying beaver in a boreal forest in Minnesota found 
that ponds and the meadows that result from them are "patches of high standing stocks of 
ions and nutrients in surface organic profiles and, for nitrogen, in plant-available forms."' 
Over 61 years, at one of the ponds studied in Minnesota, nutrients in the soil increased 
dramatically. Nitrates (NO3) increased 208%, Calcium 137%, and Magnesium 169%. 
These substances did not accumulate from the beaver directly, but from how the animals 
move nutrients into ponds by decreased water velocity and plant decomposition, 
accumulate it over the lives of their ponds, and then make it available to the plants when 
the pond drains and the rich soil is exposed. The grasses and shrubs that benefit from the 
sedimentation complete the process by making the soil less likely to erode from between 
their roots.* 
In the absence of large numbers of dams, erosion rates have remained 
significantly high in Snake Country since the 1820s. Extensive cattle grazing, beginning 
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in the 1840s and 1850s ensured that the maximum effects of the fiir desert policy would 
be experienced. Moreover, in the 1970s as ranchers shifted from sheep to cattle over 
much of the grazing lands of Idaho, the situation worsened, according to Lew Pence. In 
contrast to sheep that can be herded into uplands, cattle wallow in the streams, trampling 
the vegetation and eating the new willow shoots down to the nubs. Many riparian areas 
have not had the opportunity to repair themselves with or without the beaver's aid 
because of grazing pressure. As a result, the amount of fertile ground had decreased over 
the last 170 years as the rate of soil moving downstream has increased and the amount 
deposited by sedimentation has decreased.' 
Water quality also changes as it stands in beaver ponds and passes through dams. 
Larger rivers, such as the Clearwater and the Snake, had higher water quality because less 
silt left streambanks that were protected by beaver dams. The chemical composition also 
changed because of beaver ponds. Studies done on water in forest streams in the 
Adirondack Mountains before and after it passed through a beaver dam showed that 
acidity declined, as did dissolved oxygen, while the acid neutralizing capacity and the 
dissolved organic carbon increased. Similarly, in a stream study in Oregon, ponded areas 
had higher concentrations of nutrients and higher rates of benthic primary production. 
Lower acidity and increased oxygen and nutrients improved the stream as habitat for 
insect larvae and other microorganisms. Fish populations rely on these food sources and 
their numbers decline in streams with excessively high acidity or low nutrient levels.'" 
Most importantly for the semi-arid Snake Country, with beaver in place, winter 
runoff stayed in Snake Country longer before sliding off through valleys and canyons to 
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the Columbia River and the Pacific Ocean. The ponds kept the runoff at higher elevations 
longer. The volume of water released to lower elevations was more evenly distributed 
over the course of the year. This complemented the already reduced levels of erosion 
discussed above." 
The amount of water retained directly depended on how many beaver were 
building dams. Over time, as the number of colonies declined in Snake Country, less 
ponds were built and maintained to hold the water in the region. In the spring of 1831 
streams ran unusually high. John Work's expedition came across streams where prior 
expeditions had only found dry beds. A direct connection between trapping, beaver dam 
failures, and higher water at lower elevations can not be conclusively proven, but 
overtrapping most likely contributed to the situation Work experienced. Beaver numbers 
had declined sharply by the 1830s. The Snake Country Expedition followed much of the 
same circuit in 1830-31 as Ogden had in 1827-28. From the area where Ogden had 
trapped 3093 beaver, Work could only bring in 866.'^ 
Retained water did not only stay in the pond or streambed. Some soaked into the 
streambanks and raised the overall amount of surface water available to plants. In a 
region where évapotranspiration averaged between 24 and 36 inches, evaporation rates 
varied from 28 to 42 inches, and precipitation could be as low as ten inches per year and 
only as high as 60 inches in the mountains, water retention was crucial. Though the ponds 
increased surface evaporation, the decreased loss to runoff outweighed that 
disadvantage.'^ 
Studies in Wyoming and Colorado have looked into the consequences of beaver's 
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presence and absence for hydrological systems. Frederic J. Athearn wrote a survey of the 
situation, past and present, on the White River in Colorado. He found that trapping had 
nearly cleared the area of beaver and riparian areas along the river had declined. He saw 
the loss of riparian areas as the result of the lack of beaver and several other causes, such 
as "lowered water table, removal of an undergrowth by ranchers, increased soil erosion 
due to lack of cover vegetation, and other manmade modifications that caused permanent 
changes along the White." Athearn does not connect these other causes to the beaver, but 
they would have influenced or worsened the consequences, such as increased erosion 
following the removal of the undergrowth by ranchers. In southwestern Wyoming, a 
Rock Creek District (of the Bureau of Land Management) study project attempted to 
address riparian degradation issues on two creeks. Dams built by reintroduced beaver did 
not solve all of the problems on these creeks, but they did cause decreased erosion and 
increased sedimentation on which riparian vegetation could be reestablished. The BLM 
staff provided some building materials, but the beaver did most of the work on their own. 
Through their activities, beaver influenced nearly all aspects of the physical structure of 
the riparian community.'" 
The plants and animals that relied on riparian zones both benefited and (in some 
cases) suffered from the beaver activity. The soil retained, as explained above, provided 
places for the plants to grow And the plants that found a drained pond to grow in could 
draw on the nutrients trapped in the soil. The water retained in the soil had multiple 
implications for plants. First, the growing season lasted longer because sufficient water 
remained available to the vegetation. The water that seeped into the surrounding soils 
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elevated the water table so that the water was within reach of plant roots and stayed there 
during the exceptionally dry summer and fall months. Without the dams, the water table 
dropped. A pond at Summit Creek in Custer County Idaho provides a good illustration of 
how beaver dams affected surface water. The Intermountain Research Station has studied 
a beaver pond at Summit Creek for its impact on grazed areas. They found that the pond 
had 741 acres of surface water. One primary and several secondary dams maintained the 
water impoundment. This amount of water contrasted the streambed sharply with the 
surrounding landscape and circumstances. The area received only 10.78 inches of 
precipitation annually. The riparian areas along the creek where no beaver built dams 
were only 45 to 90 yards wide, approximately half the size of the beaver ponded area. At 
the pond site, three different vegetation community types developed. These include: 
willow (Salix spp.)/mesic herbaceous, mat muhly (Muhlenbugia richardsonis)/hmnmock, 
and mesic herbaceous species. Outside of the pond site the sagebrush {Artemisia 
spp.)/upland shrub-steppe vegetation community is the only habitat. This habitat diversity 
at the pond demonstrates how important beaver ponds can be for structural diversity 
within an ecosystem like the sagebrush steppe of southern Idaho that is dominated by one 
vegetation community.'^ 
At Deer Creek in northeastern Nevada, the Intermountain Research Station staff 
determined that a lowered water table most likely caused a change in the vegetation that 
the streambank could support. Instead of willow species, currant, snowberry, rose, and 
other large shrubs filled the sides of the creek. Currant replacing willows due to a drop in 
the water table has been documented elsewhere. In return for the water they gain, the 
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increased number of plants growing on the streambanks checks the erosion rate in two 
ways. First, the velocity of the water drops as it flows through the dense willow stands. 
Second, the roots of all species of plants will hold onto the soil, and low-lying vegetation 
coverage protects soil.'® 
Beaver foraging and dam building influence stand composition. In 1954 a study 
on Hagenbarth Pond in eastern Clark County, Idaho found that over three years, at a 
colony with a maiximum of five beaver at any one time, beaver cut an average of 269 
aspens per year, for a total of 807 trees felled. Beaver felling trees opens an area for new 
growth." At Hagenbarth Pond, "Aspen reproduction in the form of root suckers two to 
three feet high was moderate to heavy in the older 'clear-cut' portions of the stands 
immediately north, northeast, and southeast of the pond."'^ A beaver uses about 8800 
pounds of timber (with bark) per year. They cut these trees in groups, which further 
influences the forest composition by promoting the growth of softwood trees that need 
sunlight, such as firs." 
Tree growth initially declines around beaver impoundments but then, as new 
habitat develops, different species flourish. At Deer Creek in Nevada, Warren P. Clary 
and Dean E. Medin found that, "Narrow floodplains with dead and drowned aspen are 
common in the study area. These remnaints of aspen communities were once flooded by 
beaver impoundments that drowned the trees."^" Flooding can be helpful to certain 
species, if it is part of a disturbance event and creates scoured areas such as gravel or 
sediment bars. Some species of willow do not successfully compete with other vegetation 
and will not be able to establish themselves without a recently cleared patch of land.^' At 
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Summit Creek, comparisons of photographs taken over a period of time showed a 
"pronounced enlargement of the willow stands since the construction of beaver dams."^^ 
Beaver promoted new growth in willows by selecting larger, older stems for their dams. 
New shoots grow from the stumps. Additionally, when beaver build their dams they may 
inadvertently plant willow shoots, further determining which plants will eventually grow 
around their ponds.^^ 
When trappers removed the beaver from Snake Country, they probably caused a 
series of events. First, untended dams eventually failed, causing some initial benefits for 
vegetation, such as scour, pond bottom exposure, and fewer drowned trees. Over time, 
however, a lowered water table, lost surface water and increased erosion resulted from the 
reduced number of beaver colonies. The consequences went beyond the vegetation to the 
animals that rely on riparian areas for water, food, and habitat.^" 
Beaver activity in the early nineteenth century not only affected soil and water, 
but also benefited the animals that live in Snake Country. Vast portions of the region, 
even those with some tree growth fall into the semiarid category. Even water that beaver 
impounded would not have made any large percentage of land lush and green. Instead, 
streams would have supported riparian areas that beaver dams enhanced and expanded, as 
at Summit Creek, although the percentage of area they covered was relatively small. In 
the semiarid climate these riparian areas would have stood out in sharp contrast to the 
surroundings. To animals, the strips of vegetation along streams signaled that water, food, 
and habitat could be found there. In an area where annual precipitation was as low as ten 
inches per year, anything that improved water availability would have had a significant 
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impact on the ecosystem. 
Ogden and Work worried that they would not find forage for their horses 
whenever they had to leave the streambanks for open country. In the land of sagebrush, 
the streambanks supported the only certain sources of edible and nutritious vegetation. 
For animals such as deer, elk, and antelope, the riparian areas provided sure sources of 
forage as they moved between summer and winter feeding areas or moved onto new 
range as the old one filled up or was temporarily overgrazed or browsed. Willows, 
grasses, sedges, and forbs grew in the riparian areas and were excellent forage. 
Insectivorous birds enjoyed the abundance of hatches from the pond.^^ 
The beaver-produced vegetation that animals foraged and that also acted as 
habitat. Structural diversity, so important in providing habitat for a wide range of species, 
increased as riparian areas developed. Because they were lineal in shape, the amount of 
edge created was maximized, thus creating enhanced habitat for species from both sides 
of the edge and the edge itself. Also, the diversity of vegetation types found in riparian 
zones established an area where the number of different types of nesting sites and feeding 
activities increased because the height and other characteristics of the vegetation varied 
substantially, especially if the riparian area was in a coniferous forest. When a pond filled 
in behind a beaver dam, other new habitats developed. Tree swallows and woodpeckers 
made their homes in drowned trees. Frogs, salamanders, and some fish took advantage of 
the slower, deeper water in the pond. At the outset of the fur desert policy, all of these 
conditions would have characterized Snake Country.^^ 
Conditions in the riparian zones also draw animals. The vegetation that grows in 
the riparian areas because of this water creates a microclimate that has higher humidity, 
transpiration, shade, and air movement. Of the 378 terrestrial species that live in the Blue 
Mountains in the western portion of the fur desert, 285 need riparian areas to survive or 
they rely on them significantly. Some animals do not establish residence on the riparian 
zones but linger there for a significant amount of time. Deer will wade into the ponds to 
escape the mosquitoes.^' A researcher in the Blue Mountains who studied elk found that, 
"Elk on a Blue Mountain summer range spent 40 percent of their time in riparian zones, 
which made up only 7 percent of the area."^^ 
Most species, however, rely on wetlands for feeding, nesting, and breeding. 
Numerous studies have determined the extent to which the wetlands are used. At Douglas 
Creek near Meeker, Colorado, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife counted 93 species in beaver 
pond habitat. Outside of that area, the species diversity and bird counts declined. For the 
Snake River Valley in Washington, a group of researchers for the Biological Services 
Program reported that 50% of the bird species in the region relied on riparian vegetation 
for survival. At Sm-nmit Creek in Idaho, bird and small mammal populations demonstrate 
how important the beaver pond can be for species success. The study group live-trapped 
153 small rodents at the beaver pond site. In the adjacent, non-beaver-pond habitat they 
trapped only 50 animals. The species diversity was the same but the pond habitat 
supported far more animals. The study group also counted birds. Thirteen different 
species lived in the beaver pond habitat, but only four were counted in the adjacent area. 
These four species also used the riparian area. Only two of these bird species had "high 
versatility ratings" which indicates they could adapt to a range of plant communities for 
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feeding and reproducing. All the others had low ratings. Finally, a riparian ecosystem 
study identified 350 species that rely on healthy riparian habitats in the region of the fur 
desert.^' 
Although beaver did not create and maintain all the riparian areas in Snake 
Country, they played a significant role. At Summit Creek a beaver colony impounded 741 
acres of surface water. At that site and elsewhere, they did what streams cannot: pond 
water. Riparian areas only expand outward from the streambanks if a larger volume of 
water is retained to support the vegetation. 
When the Hudson's Bay Company and American trappers cleared the area of 
beaver no one recorded the consequences, but as the foregoing attests, they must have 
been tremendous. Figuring an average of six beaver per colony, the 35,000 taken out by 
the Company represents the equivalent of nearly 6,000 beaver ponds, given that some 
would have had bank burrows and others would have built more than one dam. The 
general effect would have been profound desertification across much of the region over 
time as beaver dams failed and were not replaced. Human acticities, such as agriculture, 
ranching, and logging would later amplify the problem. 
Time and a multitude of forces acting on and within the local communities in 
Snake Country obscure the consequences of the fur desert policy for the people who lived 
there. Unlike the physical changes that can potentially be measured and calculated in 
tangible, concrete terms, cultural change is hard to describe fully, let alone measure and 
study in any absolute sense. To further complicate matters, no one watched the native 
inhabitants of Snake Country to see and record how they changed in the decades 
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immediately following the Snake Country Expeditions. But the region's near desert 
conditions made water asvital to humans as to plants or animals. With the beaver largely 
gone, the water retention of the Snake-Columbia drainage dropped and people had to 
adjust to new circumstances affecting them directly or indirectly. Ironically, in light of 
the lack of local people's involvement with the Snake Country Expeditions, the fur desert 
policy appears to have pushed the Nez Perce, Cayuse, Northern Shoshone, and Barmock 
toward more frequent interactions with Europeans and Euro-Americans, particularly 
through trade. 
The most direct line from the fur desert policy to local lifeways runs from the 
brigades to local game populations. In addition to causing habitat loss, the expeditions 
increased hunting pressure on game animals. In his study of the Snake Country 
Expedition freemen, Charles Simpson calculated their dependence on different sources of 
subsistence. Not surprisingly, beaver made up almost 60% of their diet. Bison hunting 
brought in just over 16%, and other game about 18%. Fish, berries, horses, roots, and 
trade with local inhabitants made up the remainder. The bison's disappearance from 
southern Idaho in 1841 is attributed to the combined hunting pressure by native 
inhabitants and Europeans (though the extreme drought followed by a severe winter in 
1830-1831 could not have helped).^" 
Further pressure on local game populations resulted from the horse herds 
maintained by the Nez Perce and Cayuse primarily for trade, and the Northern Shoshone-
Bannock primarily for bison hunting. Shoshone on the Salmon River described the horse 
herds on the lower Snake and the Columbia to Lewis and Clark as being "as numerous as 
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the grass of the plains."^' The horses competed with game animals for forage. This did 
not improve conditions east of what is now American Falls, Idaho, where bison herds 
relied on resoui ces already depleted by the consequences of beaver removal. 
An undocumented but likely consequence of the fur desert policy concerns the 
plants used by native people. In the drier areas especially, but across the region, a shorter 
growing season without retained water and more erosion would have affected food 
supplies. Roots played a tremendously important role in Plateau subsistence. Places like 
the Camas Prairie do not appear to have lessened in productivity because of their 
proximity to the mountains, but the overall situation must have declined. 
European and Euro-Americans' journals give some sketchy indications of 
conditions in Snake Country following beaver removal. Peter Skene Ogden wrote on two 
separate occasions in February and March of 1828 about groups of "Snakes" near the 
Portneuf River who apparently had some difficulty surviving the winter. In February he 
wrote, "Upwards of 100 Starving Snakes [most likely Northern Shoshone] in the Camp 
most insolent and troublesome for food."^^ Then in March he recorded, "Indians flocking 
around us from all quarters complaining of starvation, but we cannot assist them, we 
require all we have."" Fifteen years later, in October 1843, John C Fremont noted the 
conditions of the Northern Shoshone living near where Rock Creek entered the Snake. He 
noted they lacked enough animal skins to make sufficient clothing for themselves, but 
they seemed well fed.^'* When Fremont arrived at Fort Boise the same month, the HBC's 
Francois Payette informed him that, "every year since his arrival at this post, he had 
unsuccessfully endeavored to induce these people, [the local Northern Shoshone] to lay 
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up a store of salmon for their winter provision."^^ But they hadn't heeded his advice and, 
therefore, they starved every winter. These men painted a picture of the Northern 
Shoshone living a miserable, precarious existence without enough to eat or to clothe 
themselves. These conditions could be taken as evidence of the dire environmental, and 
thus social, consequences of the fur desert. As tempting it is to take these remarks at face 
value and declare the fur desert policy created severe circumstances for the local people, 
that would ignore the distinct possibility the traders' own value systems colored their 
observations. 
Elizabeth Vibert's recently published study of fur traders' interpretations of 
Plateau cultures sheds some light on the implications of using traders' journals to 
reconstruct life on the Plateau in the early nineteenth century. She argues their writings 
essentially tell historians more about the British than the native people of the Plateau. She 
leaves the Snake Country Expeditions out of her study, but her conclusions apply to 
comments made by Peter Skene Ogden and Francois Payette about local circumstances in 
the 1820's and 1840's. Regarding the use of the word "starving," Vibert draws on the 
definition that was specific to the HBC in the Plateau. Their definition implies not an 
actual starvation situation in which no food is available. Instead, "starving" meant the 
"indolent" local people had chosen not to pursue furs or the hunt, both of which could 
have provided them with sustenance more appropriate than salmon, which the traders 
disparaged. Vibert connects the traders use of the word "starving" and "indolent" with 
their frustration that Plateau people would not trap furs for them and the prevailing 
British sentiment that manhood lay in hard work, such as hunting.^^ 
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Since neither any HBC traders nor any American explorers or emigrants make 
reference to people actually dying of starvation in Snake Country, to use these journal 
entries as indications of fur desert policy consequences is questionable. Even though the 
Snake Country Expeditions precluded the Company's use of Northern Shoshone as fur 
trappers, the officers had formed their opinions of Native American activities in other 
areas of the Plateau, where each worked prior to the Snake Country Expeditions. Those 
attitudes toward local subsistence patterns formed prior to entering Snake Country would 
most likely still be applied to the new people they met. 
Even if the people in Snake Country did not starve due to the repercussions of the 
fur desert policy, there is evidence that environmental conditions had deteriorated. John 
Work's Expedition of 1830-31 felt the consequences of the fur desert policy directly. 
While trapping near the Salmon River, the lack of beaver required the trappers to look 
elsewhere for their meals. A pronounced lack of game in the area left them in temporary 
dire straits: "One of the men, Toupe, was obliged to kill a horse to eat, and several others 
will soon be obliged to do the same, being so long in the mountains and finding no 
beaver, the people have eaten up all their provisions."" Likewise, John C. Fremont's 
journal entries do not express any sense of wonder that they cannot find game, but the 
absence of hunted animal is conspicuous. The party killed their oxen and horses one at a 
time as the resources they had brought began to run low- They did not mention relying on 
any local game. Ogden had only resorted to killing his horses for food in dire 
circumstances involving substantial snows or true desert conditions in which large game 
had never been a reliable resource. Not once in his journals did he mention having to 
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resort to his pack animals for food when he was near the Snake River in the early fall, as 
Fremont did/® These conditions Work and Fremont experienced indicate the reduction of 
game animals. 
A more reliable and fruitful source of information about the likely consequences 
of the fur desert policy for the people in Snake Country can be found in the changing 
economic activities of the Nez Perce, Cayuse, Northern Shoshone and Baninock. Shifts in 
these activities during the 1830s and 1840s may represent in part the local response to the 
stress the fur desert put on the environment. The adaptations varied according to the 
different lifeways on the continuum between gathering-fishing and gathering-bison 
hunting. 
Arguing that the environmental consequences of the fur desert policy forced 
people to change their subsistence systems implies an environmental determinism that 
does not exist. I certainly would not claim fewer beaver led to a complete breakdown in 
the environment, nor in the native communities. Instead, it seems that this era, and the 
change in the local cultures it saw, is fertile ground for a study of how the environment 
does affect human communities. For example, applying optimal foraging theory to the 
Northern Shoshone or Nez Perce could clarify if the people shifted their activities in 
response to a decreased return from their local resources. In addition to the cultural 
influences brought by traders and missionaries, the environmental situation after the fur 
desert policy may have made agriculture or cattle ranching more appealing. If the 
environent in which they lived did not break down, did its resources for humans 
diminish? 
99 
Salmon fishing played a significant role in Nez Perce and Cayuse subsistence 
throughout the nineteenth century. The salmon that migrated as far upstream as Shoshone 
Falls would not have been affected by the fur desert. The Snake and Columbia and most 
of their tributaries would have remained well watered by the mountain snowpacks during 
salmon runs. But salmon only provided for approximately one-third to one-half of the 
food for the lower Snake and Columbia river peoples. Historians and anthropologists 
emphasize the continued importance of plants and local game in Nez Perce and Cayuse 
subsistence throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, until the reservation era 
began in 1855. Substantial evidence supports this continuance of the seasonal round on 
the Plateau. But new activities that emerged in the 1830s and 1840s also indicate that 
those resources may not have fulfilled the people's needs.^' 
By 1831 the combined pelts brought in by Cayuse and Nez Perce middlemen to 
Fort Nez Perces made up three-quarters of the post's returns for that year. In the 1820s, 
according to Alvin Josephy, the Nez Perce could not be induced to trap because they saw 
no need for the Europeans' trade goods. The Cayuse had earlier resisted participation in 
the British fur trade because they saw the HBC as usurping their role as traders on the 
Plateau. Increased trapping led to increased trading for European goods - food, clothing, 
blankets, and firearms. While not reliant on these goods, some of the Nez Perce and 
Cayuse apparently needed or wanted them enough to begin spending far more time in 
pursuit of pelts than they had before the 1830s.'"' 
Agricultural efforts also drew some Nez Perce and Cayuse away firom the 
seasonal rounds. The missionaries that arrived in 1837 on the Plateau encouraged the 
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local people to adopt a more sedentary way of life. Joel Palmer, an American traveling 
through the area in 1845, kept journals that reflect the missionaries success. At each camp 
Palmer and his group made along the Columbia, native people brought an impressive 
number of crops they had grown to trade with the Americans. On 12 September 1845, 
Cayuse and Nez Perce farmers brought "wheat, corn, potatoes, peas, pumpkins, and fish" 
to trade for "cloth, calico, nankins, and other clothes.'"" On 16 September, the Cayuse 
brought similar vegetables to trade. Further downstream near Fort Nez Perces, on 18 
September, Walla Walla farmers brought potatoes and venison. Then on 21 September, 
some identifiable native people living near the mouth of the Umatilla River visited 
several times to trade food or horses for clothing. The journalists do not comment on why 
all of these people wanted cloth goods. Why they did not or could not use hides and fiirs 
as they had before remains unclear. Perhaps the missionaries' influence had already 
encouraged some people to dress like Euro-Americans. Or, perhaps they could not find or 
trade for sufficient numbers of elk, deer, or bison hides to provide for their clothing."^ 
Also in the 1840's, Nez Perce cattle herds grew to sizable numbers. Dr. Alan 
Marshall has documented a Nez Perce cattle drive to the Great Salt Lake area sometime 
during the 1840s or 1850s. The Nez Perce accurately identified a need created in the Salt 
Lake area by Mormon settlers and Oregon Trail emigrants from which they could benefit. 
In terms of the fur desert policy, what is interesting about cattle herds and drives lies in 
the fact that the Nez Perce weighed their options for how to spend their time and use the 
land's resources and some of them chose cattle raising. In one sense, cattle ranching fits 
into the pre-fur trade subsistence system. Just as the Nez Perce had raised horses for 
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trade, they established cattle herds. More than horses however, the cattle required that the 
people stay in one place. They could not let the cattle roam like they did the horses. Also, 
cattle raising meant much more involvement in the European and Euro-American trade 
network as they were the most likely trade partners."^ 
For those Nez Perce, Cayuse, and non-mounted Northern Shoshone who stayed in 
their home territories and did not go after bison, life must have been lean. Little is known 
regarding them before the pre-Euro-American settlement era. Salmon must have become 
more important to the extent root and other plant resources declined. 
The Nez Perce and Cayuse continued going to the Great Plains to hunt buffalo 
until the herds disappeared. The hunts never provided a large percentage of their 
subsistence. In addition to the products from the bison, a number of factors influenced the 
Nez Perce and Cayuse to go east of the Continental Divide. Trade goods from the Plains, 
markets for their horses, and the chance to establish oneself as an adult and as a brave 
person all drew the hunters to the Plains. This would not be surprising except that to go 
east meant certain confrontations with the Blackfeet. Elizabeth Vibert recognizes the 
difficulties posed by the Blackfeet, particularly after they acquired guns in the 1780s and 
1790s, but she does not attempt to explain why the Plateau people would have continued 
to go to the bison hunt. According to the seasonal round described by other scholars 
regarding the Nez Perce and Cayuse, the bison hunt should have been unnecessary and, 
therefore abandoned when the risks escalated. Subsistence needs or trade good needs may 
be the explanation, particularly when considered in light of a parallel situation in the 
Northern Shoshone communities discussed below.'*'' 
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When the Salish Flathead went to the bison herds in Blackfeet territory, mornings 
and evenings they said the following speech: "People, remember that when we come to 
the buffalo Country, we are in danger of war at all times .... Do not let the enemy get the 
best of you! All young persons, post yourselves and keep watchInto this hostile 
territory the horse-mounted Northern Shoshone, in what is now eastern Idaho, traveled 
each winter to hunt bison. Elizabeth Vibert believes that the people who went to the bison 
"introduced greater security and diversity into the sustenance round.'"*^ In more secure 
and tranquil circumstances this would have been a likely scenario, but unless the 
Northern Shoshone could be certain they and their horse herds would survive the journey, 
security could hardly have been a by-product of the hunt in Blackfeet territory. 
Despite the danger, however, the Northern Shoshone not only went east, they 
went with vigor. Every year they congregated in large groups and prepared for the hunt. 
The cultures mimicked that of the Plains bison-hunting communities. The eastern 
Northern Shoshone lived in hide tipis, rode horses, and used Plains techniques for 
mounted bison hunting, hunted with bows and arrows, used the products of the bison 
extensively and traded them. Even more convincing proof of how much Plains cultures 
influenced Northern Shoshone communities is the extent to which the usually highly 
dispersed and independent Northern Shoshone living groups joined together under 
temporary leaders. While the chiefs and organizational structures did not have the 
permanence or complexity of Plains cultures, the functions remained the same: to 
maintain order and increase the chances of a successful hunt. 
Many scholars puzzle over the Plains characteristics of the Northern Shoshone, 
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Nez Perce, and Cayuse and marvel at the attacks by Blackfeet they endured. The 
Blackfeet had been pushed west by Euro-American settlement. An early advantage based 
on acquisition of the first Northern Plains traders' firearms led them to push the Northern 
Shoshone and Salish Flathead off the Plains in the mid-eighteenth century. None of these 
scholars really considers what pushed them east. It seems unlikely they went solely for 
the adventure the Blackfeet provided. 
Considering the implications of beaver removal for the landscape, plants, and 
animals in Snake Country, the fur desert policy must be included in any speculation about 
why the Northern Shoshone went to the bison. At the Indians Claims Commission in 
1952 the expert testimony included a discussion of Northern Shoshone subsistence at the 
time of Euro-American exploration and settlement: 
The lands claimed by the Shoshone and Bannock [in Idaho] encompassed great 
areas of desert; the subsistence of the Shoshone and Bannock included everything 
edible and many items traders, settlers and most modern Americans consider 
inedible; their subsistence cycle kept them ever on the move to fishing areas, 
digging areas, hunting areas, berry picking areas, etc. Applying the Commission's 
criteria, it is evident that the Shoshone and Bannock needed and that they used the 
entire area claimed.'*^ 
In this difficult environment something as disruptive as the fur desert policy could have 
had consequences substantial enough to inspire a bison hunt in the face of considerable 
odds against survival. 
A further consequence of the fur desert policy, through the bison hunt, potentially 
affected all of the people living in Snake Country. Going east of the Divide meant these 
groups of Nez Perce, Cayuse, or Northern Shoshone would need guns and ammunition to 
defend themselves against well-armed Blackfeet. As guns spread, people had to acquire 
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them or risk being dominated by those who already had them. To a greater extent than 
cattle, the trade in pelts, or agriculture could ever pull native people of the Northwest into 
the market economy, guns ensnared them. Once guns became necessary items, so did 
their upkeep. All of the supplies for repairing and using guns came from the Europeans 
and later Euro-Americans. 
This created one link in the chain that would tie the native people in the plateau to 
the capitalist economy and made them vulnerable to dependency on others for their 
subsistence. The fur desert policy certainly did not destroy the cultures of the Plateau, but 
it did undermine them. When they most needed to be prepared to defend themselves 
against outsiders, the Blackfeet and the Euro-American settlers, the influences of the fur 
desert ensnared them in a market that would eventually weaken them. 
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Conclusion 
What would inspire someone to set out to a place with roads so rough they will 
wear the feet off a horse? Why would someone come to the Pacific Northwest and think 
to clear the Snake River basin of beaver? From the first time I heard about the fur desert 
policy, in grade school, it has stayed in my mind as a peculiar thing to do. After 
researching the Expeditions for this thesis, it occurred me that however unique in details, 
in substance the policy belongs in a long tradition of human-nature relationships in the 
Northwest. Like many others Europeans and Euro-Americans the Hudson's Bay 
Company extracted raw materials from the land and took them elsewhere to be processed 
and sold. But the Native Americans living on the Columbia Plateau did not ever attempt 
anything like the fur desert policy. Why not? What made the British different? 
The single most important fact governing the different cultural groups' actions 
was worldviews. The native cultures lived in a predominately subsistence economy and 
held a strong sense of place developed over generations of living on the Plateau. Their 
worldview reflected this connection to their territory. Even though each of the 
communities on the Plateau participated in a well-developed and far-reaching trade 
network, they did not exploit resources for the capitalist market economy. They depended 
on the local environment for the bulk of their subsistence and undermining it by trapping 
out the beaver would not make sense to them. The British, however, brought an entirely 
different lifeway to the Plateau. They lived in a capitalist market economy and viewed the 
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Northwest as space filled with resources, rarely sinking their roots deeper than the surface 
dust. These differences determined how they 
would view the Northwest and why the British would carry out the fur desert policy. 
As they traveled along the tributaries to the Snake and Columbia rivers, most 
likely the traders did not ponder why and how they came to be agents of the fur desert 
policy. A multitude of individual circumstances landed the expedition members in Snake 
Country and motivated them to participate. The Company provided the unifying factor 
that bound the men and women into the brigades. The Company, in turn, probably did not 
ponder why they thought up such an idea. The context in which people live and make 
decisions is rarely clearly defined by them. People make decisions in response to 
circumstances and find perspective in hindsight. On the surface, the fur desert policy is a 
response to a seemingly urgent situation in which the Americans could have gained 
control to land and resources the Company wanted. But the motivation that fueled the fur 
desert policy lies not in the immediate situation in Snake Country but in the market 
economy in which the British existed. 
As beautiful as the Northwest is, without the opportunity for financial gain, the 
British and Americans would not have endured the hardships of traveling there. But after 
Vancouver and Gray returned to their respective ports, Lewis and Clark arrived in the 
East, and David Thompson sent his reports back to Hudson Bay, the economic potential 
of the Northwest became abundantly clear. At the same time the global market economy 
began to blossom in the late eighteenth century, the Europeans and Americans "found" a 
place with harbors for ships, timber beyond imagination, fertile ground for agricultural 
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crops, and a jumping off point for trade with Asian countries. When they evaluated the 
advantages of the region, the terminology described resources, not bays, trees, and 
ecosystems indifferent to human economic systems. To Ogden a "fine plain" was one that 
he and his party could cross with ease. A good stream was one with lots of beaver. 
The market economy produced this way of viewing the land. Carolyn Merchant 
describes the evolution of people's ideology about the land in the New England colonies 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a result of the "capitalist ecological 
revolution." She writes in Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New 
England, "No longer merely wooed for survival, nature was mastered for wealth."' 
Everything in nature became a potential resource in this worldview. Things lost any sense 
of spirituality they had possessed in the pre-market economy culture and gained identities 
based on their value to humans. 
Carl O. Sauer called the capitalist system "suicidal."^ He believed that 
environmental degradation is inherent in our economic system. His pessimism may have 
stemmed from the Depression, during which he wrote these ideas, but his comments 
strike at the heart of the fur desert policy. He wrote, "the causative element [of 
environmental degradation] is economic, only the pathologic processes released or 
involved are physical."^ It was not chance that the Northern Shoshone or Nez Perce did 
not ever attempt to clear all of their territories of a species for personal gain or to keep 
others out. Without the market economy the benefit of doing so disappears. They would 
have only been left without a link in their subsistence system and with possibly far-
ranging environmental consequences. 
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But that brings up another issue for the British. Why did they not consider the 
environmental implications of the fur desert policy? Ecological repercussions did not 
figure into the decision-making as did the potential American reaction and the projected 
profitability of the brigades. Why is it anachronistic to look back at Peter Skene Ogden 
and marvel at his lack of respect for the land? The answers lie in how the British chose to 
determine profits and losses and success in the market economy. Environmental 
degradation did not figure into a early nineteenth-century capitalist's balance sheet. 
Carolyn Merchant describes in Ecological Revolutions how lumber companies in New 
England reduced the forest cover of that region by as much as 65% by 1850 without any 
sense of responsibility for the consequences. Instead, they simply moved further upstream 
(or further west eventually) to unlogged lands. Clogging streams with silt, polluting the 
air with soot, and dissolving links in the food chain remained externalities to profit and 
loss calculations. In a culture with an ethic that valued profit making and the 
accumulation of material goods, the mechanism to limit environmental degradation was 
economic. Only if the resource failed under the pressure or became too expensive to 
exploit for a profit did a businessperson have a reason to stop extracting it. In the first half 
of the nineteenth century the consequences of this view of the land had not yet captured 
anyone's attention. The whole continent lay before the merchant capitalists, seemingly 
awaiting their "improving" hands." 
This worldview came with the Hudson's Bay Company men to the Northwest. 
Their interest lay in the region as space containing resources for their economic gain. At 
first, pelts held their attention. Over time other resources grew in importance. Timber, 
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agricultural crops, and fish all entered the global market as commodities shipped out of 
Puget Sound and Columbia River ports. Trapping nearly all of the beaver out of Snake 
Country had a sound basis as a business tactic. The Company stood to gain the immediate 
profits from the pelts and the long-term benefits of decreased competition. Without the 
Americans trying to gain access to New Caledonia or wrest the local trade away from the 
Company, the supply of pelts remained more certain and controlled and the cost of the 
trade could be kept at a minimum. Being a monopoly has its advantages. 
Elsewhere in Canada, the monopoly allowed the Company to control trapping and 
to maintain sustained yields. All during the nineteenth century, after they regained their 
position as the sole fur trading company in Canada in 1821, the Company attempted to 
limit trapping by their employees and Indians through a variety of strategies. In this 
controlled situation, beaver populations began to rebound just as the fur desert policy 
came to fruition. In Snake Country, the circumstances were anything but controlled, and 
the Company felt forced to trap aggressively and without regard for future beaver pelt 
yields.' 
The Convention of 1818 only exacerbated the situation. The British knew they 
would eventually lose all of the territory to the south of the Columbia. Whatever ill 
effects the Company might have felt from the fur desert policy, the Convention made 
them moot. If the mountains of Idaho washed away to the ocean because of the absence 
of beaver, it would not have concerned the Company. Only if the resulting sediment 
silted up the Columbia and made it impassable for boats would their actions affect their 
future profitability. In a situation where all the environmental consequences would affect 
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native communities and Euro-American settlers, nothing prevented the Company's efforts 
to clear the country of beaver. 
Maybe because of the Convention of 1818, but certainly in conjunction with it, 
the British lacked any sense of place in Snake Country. At times during the journals it 
seems as though the Expeditions were whirlwinds skimming across the surface, sweeping 
up the beaver, and dropping them at Flathead House or Fort Nez Perce. If Ogden or Work 
looked around the landscape, it was to appraise the locality for beaver habitat or horse 
forage. Their rapid pace and singular purpose prevented Snake Country from becoming a 
place to them; one which had value outside of resource commodities. 
The brigades are an extreme example of a process that happened across the West. 
William Cronon wrote about a similar circumstance on a smaller scale in Kennecott, 
Alaska. There, copper resources drew in a mining company and its workers. The workers 
stayed in one place but, like the Snake Country brigades, did not develop a sense of place 
or permanency. The miners supplied their needs by a railroad line that ran from 
Kennecott to the closest port. Their economic activity had a tremendous impact on the 
land. And when they exhausted their resource, they left. Now Kennecott is a ghost town. 
According to Cronon, 
Those who capitalized the town knew from the beginning that its key resource 
would eventually be extracted so completely as to destroy the community's raison 
d'être. They could do this because their own survival in no way depended on 
observing Kennecott's resources for the long run.® 
Again, the market economy determined that the people could exploit resources and not 
have to accept the consequences. 
The mountains of Idaho did not wash away to the ocean after the last Snake 
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Country Expedition. The environment did not collapse because of the trapping pressure. 
But the Company did not know they would not cause irreparable damage. More 
importantly, they did not weigh that possibility in making their plans. External 
circumstances, political, economic, and cultural, influenced what they would do in Snake 
Country more than any local consideration did. The Convention of 1818, the market 
economy, and the cultural value placed on wealth and material goods created a context in 
which the fur desert policy was not at all peculiar. 
The last time I sat down in a sagebrush prairie, in the Bitterroot Valley, I smelled 
the sage and felt the cold wind and imagined how Peter Skene Ogden might have felt as 
he led his party south through the valley. I wondered what made him so different from 
me. The thought of clearing a species out of Snake Country repels me and brought out his 
determination. We are both products of the market economy and similar cultures. The 
only real difference I could determine lay in subtle shifts in the intellectual contexts in 
which we have lived. Ogden lived in one in which the market ethic and the lack of any 
sense of living in a place aggravated potential environmental degradation. I live in one in 
which a slowly developing land ethic and sense of place in the Northwest ameliorate it. 
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